We are launching a new event series at CogIST! In our Workshop series, we will determine readings around a theme or topic, and we will summarize these readings in each session with a presentation prepared by the event's moderator. Subsequently, we will discuss them with the participants and study the details.
The topic of our first workshop is cognitive science's most controversial, most sensational, and most wondered about topic: CONSCIOUSNESS!
In this four-week workshop, our aim is to dissect the question of “what is consciousness?” from the perspective of cognitive science theories, to systematically explore the most influential frameworks of the consciousness literature in cognitive science today, to clarify which problem these frameworks aim to solve, and to discuss the strengths/weaknesses of each in a comparative manner. We will proceed through a main text in each session, and for those interested, we will suggest optional secondary readings that deepen the subject.
We hope that this new workshop series, with its idea of reading together, thinking together, and discussing together, will be good for you as well. We hope it enables both making a more systematic introduction to the literature and allowing participants from different backgrounds to establish a common ground for discussion around the same text. Our intention is not to proclaim truths, findings, or “discoveries” regarding consciousness; but to make visible together what each approach tries to explain, with which assumptions it proceeds, and where it gets stuck. Because we think that the best way to do science communication is not to present science’s ready-made “meals”, but to invite everyone into science’s kitchen. We wish for this first workshop, which will be shaped by your participation and contribution, to turn into a collective thinking experience that is both productive and enjoyable.
Our instructor Yunus Şahin, graduated from the Istanbul University Department of Linguistics in 2020, and subsequently started his master's degree in the Boğaziçi University Cognitive Science master's program in 2021. Here, he worked on topics such as philosophy of cognitive science, research traditions in cognitive science, and the nature of explanation in cognitive science. In his master's thesis, he studied from the perspective of philosophy of science why there is a need for a theoretical framework in cognitive science that does not center any mental concepts. This thesis directed him to the fields of philosophy of biology and biosemiotics to examine more closely the relationships between cognitive science and approaches in biology, particularly Developmental Systems Theory, Extended Evolutionary Synthesis. Currently, he is continuing his master's degree in biosemiotics at the Department of Semiotics at the University of Tartu in Estonia. Philosophy of cognitive science, philosophy of biology, and philosophy of neuroscience constitute his main areas of interest. He is the founder of the CogIST and The Analytic platforms. He has organized various events in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir Şirince, and engaged in science communication activities.
The workshop will take place online via Zoom on Sundays, February 15, 22, and March 1, 8, between 18:00 – 20:00. It will last approximately 8 hours in total. All sessions are recorded and shared with participants. The sessions can be accessed indefinitely even after the workshop ends.
First Session (February 15): Introduction to the Consciousness Literature in Cognitive Science
Main Text:
Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022). Theories of consciousness. Nature reviews. Neuroscience, 23(7), 439–452. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4
Optional Secondary Text:
Seth, A. K. (2018). Consciousness: The last 50 years (and the next). Brain and Neuroscience Advances, 2, 2398212818816019.
In this session, we will map out the current landscape of consciousness studies in cognitive science. We will discuss exactly what we mean when we say “consciousness” in cognitive science, why distinctions such as phenomenal experience and access/reportability are decisive, and to what kind of explanation expectations theories respond. Furthermore, we will see how different theories can interpret the same data in different ways, and we will establish a common conceptual ground for the approaches we will address in the coming weeks.
Second Session (February 22): Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
Main Text:
Brown, R., Lau, H., & LeDoux, J. E. (2019). Understanding the higher-order approach to consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 23(9), 754–768.
Optional Secondary Text:
Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (2011). Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(8), 365–373.
In the second session, we will address approaches that place “higher-order” representations/monitoring at the center of conscious experience. These theories explain a mental state being conscious through relations such as that state being “noticed”, “represented”, or “metacognitively accessed” by another higher-order cognitive state. While this framework offers a strong narrative on how processes like consciousness and awareness, report, metacognition, and monitoring are connected, it also faces significant conceptual and empirical objections. In the session, we will unpack together both the basic logic of the theory and the main points of discussion in the literature.
Third Session (March 1): Integrated Information Theory (IIT)
Main Text:
Albantakis, L., Barbosa, L., Findlay, G., Grasso, M., Haun, A. M., Marshall, W., Mayner, W. G. P., Zaeemzadeh, A., Boly, M., Juel, B. E., Sasai, S., Fujii, K., David, I., Hendren, J., Lang, J. P., & Tononi, G. (2023). Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms. PLOS Computational Biology, 19(10), e1011465.
Optional Secondary Text:
Tononi, G. (2008). Consciousness as integrated information: A provisional manifesto. The Biological Bulletin, 215(3), 216–242.
Tononi, G. (2012). Integrated information theory of consciousness: An updated account. Archives Italiennes de Biologie, 150(2–3), 56–90.
In the third session, we will focus on Integrated Information Theory, which attempts to derive consciousness from the causal structure of the system and the level of “integration”. To explain consciousness, IIT first moves from certain phenomenological properties (unity, irreducibility, structure, etc.) regarding what experience is “like”, and then attempts to formulate the physical conditions that would correspond to these. This approach is one of the most “sensational” and controversial theories in the literature due to its claim to quantify consciousness, its strong metaphysical implications, and debates on testability. In the session, we will evaluate together IIT’s claims, conceptual assumptions and the most frequently raised criticisms.
Fourth Session (March 8): Predictive Processing and Consciousness
Main Text:
Clark, A. (2018). Strange inversions: Prediction and the explanation of conscious experience. In B. Huebner (Ed.), The philosophy of Daniel Dennett (pp. 202–218). Oxford University Press.
Optional Secondary Text:
Solms, M. (2019). The hard problem of consciousness and the free energy principle. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 2714.
Vilas, M. G., Auksztulewicz, R., & Melloni, L. (2022). Active inference as a computational framework for consciousness. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 13(4), 859–878.
Metnin akademik terminolojisini (predictive processing, free energy principle, hard problem) ve etiketlerinin metin içindeki tam kapsamını koruyarak hazırladığım çeviri aşağıdadır:
In the fourth session, we will discuss consciousness from the perspective of predictive processing and, in its broader framework, the free energy principle/active inference. In this approach, the brain is not a device that passively “records” the world, but a system that constantly generates hypotheses, tests them, tries to minimize errors based on results, and establishes perception as an output of this dynamic balancing process. So what does this picture offer us to explain the character of conscious experience? How are the contents of experience determined, how are self and subjective viewpoint positioned, where do claims regarding the “hard problem” fall? In this session, we will address both philosophical arguments and contemporary computational proposals in a comparative manner.
The fee for the workshop is 1000 TL per person, including VAT. Payment details will be shared with participants whose applications are approved as soon as possible.
