{"id":5829,"date":"2026-07-20T14:10:21","date_gmt":"2026-07-20T14:10:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cog-ist.com\/?post_type=blog_content&#038;p=5829"},"modified":"2026-07-20T14:11:11","modified_gmt":"2026-07-20T14:11:11","slug":"beyinde-niyet-diye-bir-sey-yok-niyet-kavramina-wittgenstein-perspektifinden-bir-bakis-annemarie-kalis","status":"publish","type":"blog_content","link":"https:\/\/cog-ist.com\/en\/blog_content\/beyinde-niyet-diye-bir-sey-yok-niyet-kavramina-wittgenstein-perspektifinden-bir-bakis-annemarie-kalis\/","title":{"rendered":"Beyinde &#8220;Niyet&#8221; Diye Bir \u015eey Yok: Niyet Kavram\u0131na Wittgenstein Perspektifinden Bir Bak\u0131\u015f &#8211; Annemarie Kalis"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Makalenin \u00d6zg\u00fcn Ad\u0131: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.frontiersin.org\/journals\/psychology\/articles\/10.3389\/fpsyg.2019.00946\/full\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">No Intentions in the Brain: A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Science of Intention<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:35px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size:30px\"><strong>\u00d6zet<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:35px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Uithol vd. (2014) \u201c\u0130nsan\u0131n niyetlerini neden beyinde bulamayabiliriz\u201d isimli \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131nda, \u201ceyleme ge\u00e7menin (initiation) ve eylemi kontrol etmenin ard\u0131nda yatan s\u00fcre\u00e7lerin, sadece niyet kavram\u0131n\u0131n m\u00fcsaade etti\u011finden \u00e7ok daha dinamik ve ba\u011flam ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131 oldu\u011funu\u201d ikna edici \u015fekilde savunur. Yapt\u0131klar\u0131 bu \u00e7al\u0131\u015fma, zihinsel kavramlar\u0131n n\u00f6ral e\u015fleniklerini (neural correlates) bulmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan yakla\u015f\u0131mlara kar\u015f\u0131 bir ele\u015ftiri olarak da yorumlanablir. Daha spesifik olarak, niyetin bariz n\u00f6ral e\u015flenikleri olmamas\u0131n\u0131n, niyetin ne oldu\u011fuyla ilgili klasik anlay\u0131\u015f\u0131m\u0131z\u0131 da zay\u0131flatt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 iddia ederler. Bu yaz\u0131y\u0131 yazmaktaki amac\u0131m, bahsedilen bu arg\u00fcman\u0131 bir ad\u0131m ileri ta\u015f\u0131makt\u0131r.  \u00d6ncelikle, folk-psikolojik <a id=\"_ftnref1\" href=\"#_ftn1\">[1]<\/a> kavray\u0131\u015f\u0131m\u0131z\u0131n, niyeti farkl\u0131 \u015fekillerde anlamam\u0131za alan tan\u0131d\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve&nbsp;Uithol vd. taraf\u0131ndan ele al\u0131nan niyet kavram\u0131n\u0131n ise k\u00f6kenlerini nedensel eylem kuram\u0131nda (causal theory of action) ve bili\u015fe i\u015flevselci yakla\u015f\u0131mlarda bulan akademik bir kavram oldu\u011funu iddia edece\u011fim.&nbsp;Bu iki paradigman\u0131n da tart\u0131\u015fmal\u0131 oldu\u011funu ve bu sebeple niyete dair alternatif teorik yakla\u015f\u0131mlar i\u00e7in bir manevra alan\u0131 bulundu\u011funu savunaca\u011f\u0131m. Hemen ard\u0131ndan Wittgenstein&#8217;\u0131n zihin felsefesine dayanan alternatif bir bak\u0131\u015f a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131 sunaca\u011f\u0131m. Bu noktada \u00f6zellikle niyet s\u00f6yleminin (intention talk) y\u00f6nlendirici (regulative) rol\u00fcn\u00fc vurgulayaca\u011f\u0131m. Fakat bu anlay\u0131\u015f, n\u00f6ral ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirim (neural realization) hakk\u0131nda \u015fu soruyu g\u00fcndeme getiriyor:&nbsp;Niyet \u00fczerine konu\u015fmak sadece laftan m\u0131 ibarettir, yoksa niyetler ger\u00e7ekten var m\u0131d\u0131r? Niyetin bir t\u00fcr \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fc tan\u0131ma olarak anla\u015f\u0131lmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fini ve s\u00f6z konusu \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fclerin hem zaman hem de mek\u00e2na yay\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6ne s\u00fcrece\u011fim. Sonu\u00e7 b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fc ise niyetin n\u00f6robilimsel olarak incelenmesiyle ilgili \u00f6nemli \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131lar sunacak.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:35px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li style=\"font-size:30px\"><strong>Giri\u015f<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:35px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Bu makale, <em>niyet<\/em> kavram\u0131n\u0131 nas\u0131l anlamam\u0131z gerekti\u011fini felsefi a\u00e7\u0131dan ele almaktad\u0131r.<\/strong> \u00c7ince \u00f6\u011frenmek, anne-babam\u0131z\u0131 ziyaret etmek ya da yeni bir bisiklet almak gibi eylemlere insan\u0131n nas\u0131l karar al\u0131p da kendini verdi\u011fini (commit)\u00a0ve bu bunun hayat\u0131m\u0131zda nas\u0131l bir fark yaratt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 nas\u0131l anlamland\u0131raca\u011f\u0131z? Niyetin nas\u0131l anla\u015f\u0131lmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fi felsefi bir tart\u0131\u015fma olmakla beraber, son y\u0131llarda psikologlar ve n\u00f6robilimciler i\u00e7in de giderek \u00f6nemli bir mesele haline gelmi\u015ftir. Son 30 y\u0131l i\u00e7inde bili\u015fsel bilim alan\u0131nda, niyet olu\u015fturmay\u0131 (intention formation) ve bilin\u00e7li iradeyi (conscious volition) inceleyen \u00e7ok say\u0131da \u00e7al\u0131\u015fma yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r (Libet, 1985; Blakemore ve Decety, 2001; Haggard ve Libet, 2001; Haggard ve Clark, 2003; Haynes vd., 2007; Bisley ve Goldberg, 2010; Gallivan vd., 2011; Haynes, 2011). Bu \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck bir k\u0131sm\u0131, Libet\u2019in \u00f6nceki ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar\u0131na dayanmaktad\u0131r. <strong>Libet, eyleme y\u00f6nelik bilin\u00e7li bir niyetin ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131ndan \u00f6nce, beyinde \u201c(eyleme) haz\u0131rl\u0131k potansiyeli\u201d (readiness potential) olarak adland\u0131r\u0131lan aktivasyonun ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6stermi\u015ftir<\/strong> (Libet, 1985). Bu \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar, \u201cniyet\u201din ne oldu\u011funa dair zaten \u00fcst\u00fc kapal\u0131 bir varsay\u0131mla ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Libet\u2019in deneylerinde ve benzer \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalarda, bilin\u00e7li niyet \u00f6z-bildirimle (self-report) \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcl\u00fcr; kat\u0131l\u0131mc\u0131lardan eyleme ge\u00e7me\u00a0niyetini ne zaman hissettiklerini s\u00f6ylemeleri istenir.<strong> Daha net ifade etmek gerekirse, kat\u0131l\u0131mc\u0131lardan, ilgili davran\u0131\u015f\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirme iste\u011fine dair bilin\u00e7li fark\u0131ndal\u0131\u011f\u0131n ilk ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131\u011f\u0131 an\u0131 bildirmeleri istenir.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cS\u00f6z konusu deneyim, kat\u0131l\u0131mc\u0131lara eyleme ge\u00e7mek i\u00e7in bir \u2018d\u00fcrt\u00fc\u2019, \u2018karar\u2019 ya da \u2018niyet\u2019 olarak aktar\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r, ancak kat\u0131l\u0131mc\u0131lar bunu genellikle \u2018isteme\u2019 ya da \u2018d\u00fcrt\u00fc\u2019 gibi ifadelerle belirtmi\u015flerdir\u201d (Libet vd., 1983). Libet bu y\u00f6ntemi \u015fu \u015fekilde gerek\u00e7elendirir: \u201c<strong>E\u011fer bilin\u00e7li bir niyet ya da karar g\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fc bir hareketi ger\u00e7ekten ba\u015flat\u0131yorsa, niyetin bu \u00f6znel deneyimi (niyeti hissetti\u011fimiz o an), ilgili beyin s\u00fcre\u00e7lerinin ba\u015flamas\u0131ndan \u00f6nce gelmeli ya da en az\u0131ndan onlarla ayn\u0131 anda ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmal\u0131d\u0131r<\/strong>\u201d (Libet, 1985, s. 529). Bu da \u015funu g\u00f6sterir: Libet i\u00e7in (1) <strong>niyet bilin\u00e7li bir \u015fekilde ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmek zorundad\u0131r<\/strong> (\u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc ki\u015finin bilin\u00e7li fark\u0131ndal\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ifade etmesi, niyetin varl\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in temel bir kan\u0131t kabul edilir) ve (2) <strong>niyetlerin g\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fc eylemlerin meydana gelmesinde nedensel bir rol oynad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6stermektedir<\/strong>. Libet\u2019in kendi \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmas\u0131ndan \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131\u011f\u0131 sonu\u00e7 niyetlerin \u201charekete ge\u00e7irilmemi\u015f harekete ge\u00e7iriciler (unmoved movers)\u201d olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclmemesi gerekti\u011fidir; \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc <strong>g\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fc eylemler bilin\u00e7li bir niyet olu\u015fmadan \u00f6nce ba\u015flamaktad\u0131r<\/strong>. Bu da, \u00f6zg\u00fcr irade \u00fczerine yap\u0131lan tart\u0131\u015fmalara fazlas\u0131yla etki etmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Libet\u2019in \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k, ba\u015fka bir yakla\u015f\u0131m ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. <strong>Bu yakla\u015f\u0131ma g\u00f6re, haz\u0131rlay\u0131c\u0131 beyin s\u00fcre\u00e7leri bilin\u00e7li niyetin <em>\u00f6nc\u00fcl\u00fc<\/em> (precursor) de\u011fil, asl\u0131nda onun n\u00f6ral temelleridir<\/strong> (neural underpinnings). G\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczde bu \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar, haz\u0131rl\u0131k potansiyellerini \u00f6l\u00e7mek yerine beyin g\u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcleme verilerini (fMRI) daha geli\u015fmi\u015f y\u00f6ntemlerle inceler, \u00f6rne\u011fin MVPA (multivoxel pattern analysis) gibi teknikler kullan\u0131l\u0131r. Mesela, baz\u0131 \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar niyetlerin beyin aktivitesine bak\u0131larak&nbsp; \u201cokunabildi\u011fini\u201d ya da \u201c\u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmlenebildi\u011fini\u201d (decoding) \u00f6ne s\u00fcrmektedir (Gallivan vd., 2011; Haynes, 2011). Bu t\u00fcr \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n temel amac\u0131, niyetin bili\u015fsel ve olduk\u00e7a soyut s\u00fcre\u00e7lerinin \u201cn\u00f6ral temelleri\u201d (neural underpinnings) hakk\u0131nda daha fazla i\u00e7g\u00f6r\u00fc elde etmektir (Gallivan vd., 2011, s. 9599). Bug\u00fcne kadar yap\u0131lan \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar s\u0131kl\u0131kla \u201ckorteksin geni\u015f b\u00f6lgelerinin, gelecek hareketler i\u00e7in \u00f6nceden haz\u0131rland\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131\u201d g\u00f6stermi\u015ftir (Haynes, 2011, s. 11). Bu \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalarda \u201cniyet\u201d kavram\u0131 genellikle a\u00e7\u0131k bir \u015fekilde tan\u0131mlanmaz. Ancak elde edilen sonu\u00e7lar\u0131n niyetlerin \u201c\u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmlenmesi\u201d ya da \u201cokunmas\u0131\u201d olarak yorumlanmas\u0131 (Haynes vd., 2007), niyetlerin davran\u0131\u015fa haz\u0131rl\u0131k yapan ve ona nedensel olarak katk\u0131da bulunan s\u00fcre\u00e7ler olarak anla\u015f\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6sterir. Niyet kavram\u0131yla ilgili varsay\u0131lan bu nedensel ili\u015fki \u00e7e\u015fitli \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalarda tart\u0131\u015f\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<strong> <\/strong>\u00d6rne\u011fin Haynes (2011, s. 16), makalenin tart\u0131\u015fma b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcnde \u201ckarara dair ilk a\u015famada ortaya \u00e7\u0131kan beyin sinyallerinin, karar\u0131n olu\u015fumuna ger\u00e7ekten neden olup olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n belirsiz oldu\u011fu\u201d uyar\u0131s\u0131nda bulunur. Daha a\u00e7\u0131k ifade etmek gerekirse, Haggard ve Clark (2003, s. 696) \u201cniyet ile eylem aras\u0131ndaki nedensel bir zincirden\u201d bahseder. <strong>Onlara g\u00f6re, normal bir g\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fc<\/strong> (intentional) <strong>eylem deneyimi, asl\u0131nda s\u00f6z konusu eylemin ki\u015finin onu yapma niyeti <em>sayesinde<\/em> ve bu niyet <em>arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla<\/em> ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmesini de i\u00e7erir<\/strong> (s. 696, vurgu orijinal metinden).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Ancak yak\u0131n zamanda baz\u0131 ara\u015ft\u0131rmac\u0131lar, niyetlerin ayr\u0131\u015f\u0131k <\/strong>(discrete)<strong> ve nedensel olarak etkin<\/strong> (causally efficacious) <strong>durumlar olarak anla\u015f\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 durumda, tespit edilebilir n\u00f6ral e\u015flenikleri oldu\u011funa \u015f\u00fcpheyle yakla\u015fm\u0131\u015flard\u0131r<\/strong> (Uithol vd., 2014; Burnston, 2015; Schurger ve Uithol, 2015; Verbaarschot vd., 2016). \u00d6zellikle, Uithol vd. (2014), eylemi kontrol etmekten sorumlu beyin b\u00f6lgesinde (lateral prefrontal korteks) ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen n\u00f6ral aktivasyonun enformasyon a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan yo\u011fun, karma\u015f\u0131k ve dinamik bir yap\u0131ya sahip oldu\u011funu g\u00f6stermi\u015ftir. <strong>Onlara g\u00f6re, eylemin ba\u015flat\u0131lmas\u0131 ve kontrol edilmesindeki s\u00fcre\u00e7ler, niyet kavram\u0131n\u0131n m\u00fcsaade etti\u011finden \u00e7ok daha dinamik ve ba\u011flama duyarl\u0131 oldu\u011funu g\u00f6steriyor<\/strong>. \u00d6rne\u011fin, geleneksel anlay\u0131\u015fa g\u00f6re elma yeme niyeti, hangi elman\u0131n se\u00e7ilece\u011fi, nerede yenilece\u011fi ya da elman\u0131n nas\u0131l al\u0131naca\u011f\u0131 gibi detaylardan ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zd\u0131r. Ancak Uithol ve \u00e7al\u0131\u015fma arkada\u015flar\u0131, lateral prefrontal korteksteki (lPFC) aktivitenin, her \u00e7e\u015fit enformasyonu b\u00fct\u00fcnle\u015ftirmesi nedeniyle son derece ba\u011flama duyarl\u0131 oldu\u011funu savunur. <strong>Bu bulgu, niyetlerin ba\u011flamdan ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z olarak ger\u00e7ekle\u015fti\u011fi d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcncesini zay\u0131flat\u0131r<\/strong>. <strong>\u0130kinci olarak, eylemin kontrol etme s\u00fcrecinde meydana gelen n\u00f6ral s\u00fcre\u00e7ler karma\u015f\u0131kt\u0131r<\/strong>. <strong>Ve bu durum niyetlerin ayr\u0131\u015f\u0131k durumlar oldu\u011fu fikrini \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde zay\u0131flat\u0131r<\/strong>. <strong>Buna g\u00f6re, eylemi kontrol eden s\u00fcreci ba\u015flatan niyet ile bu s\u00fcreci tamamlayan<\/strong> (eylemin ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmesini sa\u011flayan) <strong>niyetin ayn\u0131 zihinsel durum oldu\u011fu gibi bir varsay\u0131m, ge\u00e7erlili\u011fini yitirir<\/strong>. <strong>Ba\u015fka bir deyi\u015fle, \u015fimdiye kadar bir eylemi ba\u015ftan sona kadar y\u00f6nlendiren tek bir stabil durum ya da s\u00fcre\u00e7 tespit etmek m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r<\/strong>. Bu y\u00fczden, niyetin ayr\u0131\u015f\u0131k ve stabil bir durum oldu\u011funu destekleyecek bir \u015fey bulunamam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu bulgular\u0131 bir arada de\u011ferlendirirsek, bu tabloya g\u00f6re, <strong>g\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fc eyleme<\/strong> (voluntary action) <strong>nedensel olarak katk\u0131da bulunan soyut ve ayr\u0131\u015f\u0131k niyet durumlar\u0131n\u0131n n\u00f6ral temeli olabilecek birtak\u0131m soyut ve y\u00fcksek seviye n\u00f6ral aktivasyonun IPFC\u2019de bulunabilece\u011fi fikri deste\u011fini yitirmi\u015ftir<\/strong> (Uithol vd., 2014).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-pullquote\"><blockquote><p>&#8220;\u015eimdiye kadar bir eylemi ba\u015ftan sona kadar y\u00f6nlendiren tek bir stabil durum ya da s\u00fcre\u00e7 tespit etmek m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Bu analizlerine dayanarak, Uithol vd. niyet nosyonunun eylem kontrol\u00fcn\u00fc bilimsel olarak \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmak i\u00e7in do\u011fru d\u00fcr\u00fcst bir katk\u0131s\u0131 olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 sonucuna var\u0131rlar.<\/strong> Dahas\u0131, eylem kontrol\u00fcn\u00fc yeniden yorumlamam\u0131z gerekti\u011fini eklerler: \u201cdikkati lokalizasyondan uzakla\u015ft\u0131ran, yukar\u0131da bahsetti\u011fimiz gibi alg\u0131sal ve motivasyonel enformasyonla s\u00fcre\u011fen ve \u00e7e\u015fitli etkile\u015fimlere sahip bir sistemi merkeze alan bir yorumlama\u201d(Uithol vd. 2014, s. 137). Bu makalede arg\u00fcman\u0131m\u0131 Uithol ve arkada\u015flar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131na dayand\u0131raca\u011f\u0131m. <strong>Ancak, bu \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n bizi olas\u0131 \u2018niyet yoktur\u2019 gibi eliminativist bir sonuca g\u00f6t\u00fcrmesine kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kaca\u011f\u0131m, zira niyet kavram\u0131n\u0131n terk edilmesi gerekti\u011fini d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnm\u00fcyorum<\/strong>. <strong>Bu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f yerine, ne felsefe gelene\u011finin ne de folk-psikolojinin bizi niyeti, eylemlerimize neden olan soyut ve ayr\u0131\u015f\u0131k zihinsel durumlar olarak d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmeye itmedi\u011fini g\u00f6sterece\u011fim<\/strong>. <strong>Daha ziyade, niyet kavram\u0131n\u0131 anlamak i\u00e7in Wittgenstein\u2019\u0131n perspektifinden yola \u00e7\u0131kan bir alternatif sunaca\u011f\u0131m<\/strong>. Bu alternatif, Uithol\u2019un bulgular\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamak i\u00e7in de ilgin\u00e7 bir yol olabilir. Benim yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131m hem anti-eliminativist hem de Wittgensteinc\u0131 bir \u00e7izgi izlemesi itibariyle Bennett ve Hacker\u2019\u0131n (2003) n\u00f6robilim ile folk-psikoloji ili\u015fkiye ele\u015ftirel yakla\u015f\u0131mlar\u0131ndan ilham alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu \u00f6nemli kitapta Bennett ve Hacker \u00e7a\u011fda\u015f n\u00f6robilimi ele\u015ftirir. <strong>Onlara g\u00f6re n\u00f6robilim, birtak\u0131m \u201cmereolojik kar\u0131\u015f\u0131kl\u0131klar\u201d \u00fcretmektedir, yani insan\u0131n sadece <em>b\u00fct\u00fcn\u00fc i\u00e7in anlaml\u0131<\/em> olan \u00f6zellikleri insan\u0131n <em>par\u00e7alar\u0131na<\/em>, \u00f6zellikle de beyne atfetmektedir<\/strong>. \u00d6rne\u011fin, insan\u0131n d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnebildi\u011fini, tart\u0131\u015fabildi\u011fini, \u00f6fkelenebildi\u011fini ve benzeri \u015feyleri yapabildi\u011fini; ancak beynin tek ba\u015f\u0131na&nbsp;bunlar\u0131n hi\u00e7birini yapamayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 savunurlar (Bennett ve Hacker, 2003, s. 68\u201374). Onlar\u0131n \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 bu makale i\u00e7in ilham verici bir arka plan olu\u015ftursa da, amac\u0131m onlar\u0131n halihaz\u0131rda var olan analizine katk\u0131 yapmak de\u011fil, <strong>daha \u00e7ok niyetlerin ne oldu\u011funa <\/strong>(Bennett ve Hacker\u2019\u0131n neredeyse hi\u00e7 yer vermedi\u011fi bir kavram)<strong> ve insanlara niyet atfetmenin ne anlama geldi\u011fine dair bir cevap sunmak istiyorum<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-pullquote\"><blockquote><p>&#8220;Onlara g\u00f6re n\u00f6robilim, birtak\u0131m \u201cmereolojik kar\u0131\u015f\u0131kl\u0131klar\u201d \u00fcretmektedir, yani insan\u0131n sadece <em>b\u00fct\u00fcn\u00fc i\u00e7in anlaml\u0131<\/em> olan \u00f6zellikleri insan\u0131n <em>par\u00e7alar\u0131na<\/em>, \u00f6zellikle de beyne atfetmektedir.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:35px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size:30px\"><strong>2. Nedensel Zihin Durumlar\u0131 Olarak Niyetler?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:35px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Geleneksel anlay\u0131\u015fa g\u00f6re niyetler, eylemlerimize neden olan, g\u00f6rece soyut<\/strong> (y\u00fcksek seviye <a href=\"#_ftn2\" data-type=\"internal\" data-id=\"#_ftn2\">[2]<\/a>, amodal <a href=\"#_ftn3\" data-type=\"internal\" data-id=\"#_ftn3\">[3]<\/a>) <strong>zihinsel temsillerdir<\/strong>. \u00d6rne\u011fin, diyelim ki kahve yapmaya niyetim var. Zihnimde tam bu s\u0131rada \u201ckahve yapma\u201d i\u00e7eri\u011fine sahip <a href=\"#_ftn4\">[4]<\/a> zihinsel bir temsil vard\u0131r. Burada i\u015fleyen s\u00fcre\u00e7 soyuttur, \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc bu zihinsel temsil kahveyi tam olarak nas\u0131l yapaca\u011f\u0131m\u0131 belirtmez (\u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc kahve yapman\u0131n birden fazla yolu vard\u0131r). Bu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fe g\u00f6re, i\u015fte tam da bu zihinsel temsil bana i\u015fe gider gitmez kahveyi yapmam\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klayan \u015feydir. Niyet hakk\u0131ndaki bu anlay\u0131\u015f felsefe, psikoloji ve n\u00f6robilim alanlar\u0131nda yayg\u0131n olarak benimsenmi\u015ftir (Davidson, 1978; Bratman, 1999; Haggard ve Libet, 2001). Hatta, bu bak\u0131\u015f a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131, niyetlerin nedenselli\u011fini ele\u015ftirenler taraf\u0131ndan bile sahiplenilmi\u015ftir (Gollwitzer, 1999; Holton, 1999, 2003; Gollwitzer ve Sheeran, 2006). Uithol, folk-psikolojide de&nbsp;niyetin benzer bir \u015fekilde alg\u0131land\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6yler (Uithol vd., 2014, s. 130).&nbsp;Fakat bu ger\u00e7ekten do\u011fru mudur? \u0130nsanlar, g\u00fcndelik ya\u015famda niyetler hakk\u0131nda ger\u00e7ekten b\u00f6yle mi konu\u015fup d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcr? <strong>Bu b\u00f6l\u00fcmde, folk-psikolojide niyetlerin \u00e7ok boyutlu ve ak\u0131\u015fkan oldu\u011funu, dolay\u0131s\u0131yla alternatif teorik yorumlara kap\u0131 aralad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6ne s\u00fcrece\u011fim<\/strong>. Aksine, <strong>niyetlerin soyut, ayr\u0131\u015f\u0131k ve nedensel temsili durumlar gibi anlaman\u0131n, asl\u0131nda <em>akademik<\/em> bir yakla\u015f\u0131m oldu\u011funu ve bu yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n k\u00f6keninin nedensel eylem kuram\u0131na<\/strong> (causal theory of action) (Davidson, 1978; Bratman, 1999; Mele, 2009) <strong>ve g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczdeki niyet psikolojisi ve n\u00f6robiliminin temelinde yatan i\u015flevselci varsay\u0131mlara<\/strong> (\u00f6rne\u011fin Haynes vd., 2007; Gallivan vd., 2011) <strong>dayand\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6sterece\u011fim<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Peki, folk-psikolojideki \u201cniyet\u201d kavram\u0131n\u0131 nas\u0131l tan\u0131mlamal\u0131y\u0131z (hatta b\u00f6yle bir \u015fey asl\u0131nda var m\u0131 ki?)? <strong>\u0130nsanlar\u0131n g\u00fcnl\u00fck hayatta \u201cniyet\u201d ve \u201cniyet etmek\u201d gibi kavramlar\u0131 nas\u0131l kulland\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcnce, dikkat \u00e7eken ilk \u015fey bu kavramlar\u0131n bir\u00e7ok farkl\u0131 \u015fekilde kullan\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131d\u0131r<\/strong> (Anscombe, 1957). \u00d6rne\u011fin, \u201cniyet\u201d kavram\u0131n\u0131 hem gelece\u011fe y\u00f6nelik planlar\u0131 ifade etmek i\u00e7in kullan\u0131r\u0131z (\u201c<em>Bir g\u00fcn zengin olmak niyetim var\u201d<\/em>) hem de ge\u00e7mi\u015f hakk\u0131nda bilgi vermek i\u00e7in kullan\u0131r\u0131z (\u201c<em>Niyetim bu de\u011fildi.\u201d)<\/em>. <strong>Ayr\u0131ca deneysel felsefe alan\u0131ndan gelen elimizdeki veriler, niyet kavram\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7o\u011fu zaman kendi ahlaki yarg\u0131lar\u0131m\u0131z\u0131<\/strong> (judgments) <strong>ifade ederken kulland\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131z\u0131 g\u00f6steriyor<\/strong>. Knobe\u2019nin (2006)&nbsp;yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 empirik bir \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaya bakal\u0131m: John bir eylemde bulunur ve bu eylem \u00e7evreye beklenmedik (dolayl\u0131 olarak) bir zarar verir. Bu durumda biz, John\u2019un <em>niyetinin <\/em>b\u00f6yle bir zarar oldu\u011funu s\u00f6yleriz. Fakat ayn\u0131 dolayl\u0131 sebep (beklenmedik etki) \u00e7evreye yarar sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, bunu \u201cJohn\u2019un niyeti \u00e7evreye yarar sa\u011flamakt\u0131.\u201d olarak yorumlamay\u0131z <a href=\"#_ftn5\">[5]<\/a>. <strong>Ba\u015fka bir deyi\u015fle, \u201cniyet\u201d ve \u201cniyet etmek\u201d gibi ifadeleri \u00e7o\u011fu zaman birini su\u00e7lamak ya da sorumlu tutmak i\u00e7in kullan\u0131r\u0131z<\/strong>. Ayr\u0131ca niyet hakk\u0131nda yap\u0131lan tart\u0131\u015fmalar bilimsel ve felsefi s\u00f6ylemden ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z de\u011fildir. Niyet hakk\u0131ndaki farkl\u0131 teoriler (bunlara a\u015fa\u011f\u0131da daha ayr\u0131nt\u0131l\u0131 de\u011finece\u011fim) zamanla g\u00fcnl\u00fck dilde de yans\u0131malar\u0131n\u0131 bulur. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-pullquote\"><blockquote><p>&#8220;Ayr\u0131ca deneysel felsefe alan\u0131ndan gelen elimizdeki veriler, niyet kavram\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7o\u011fu zaman kendi ahlaki yarg\u0131lar\u0131m\u0131z\u0131 (judgments) ifade ederken kulland\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131z\u0131 g\u00f6steriyor. (&#8230;) &#8220;niyet\u201d ve \u201cniyet etmek\u201d gibi ifadeleri \u00e7o\u011fu zaman birini su\u00e7lamak ya da sorumlu tutmak i\u00e7in kullan\u0131r\u0131z.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Bu k\u0131sa de\u011ferlendirmeden yola \u00e7\u0131karsak, <strong>niyetle ilgili tek, net ve herkes taraf\u0131ndan payla\u015f\u0131lan bir folk-psikolojik bir kullan\u0131m olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 fark edilir<\/strong>.&nbsp;Bu durum, daha temelde folk-psikolojinin kendisinin ne oldu\u011funa dair baz\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015flerle de \u00f6rt\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr: her ne kadar filozoflar folk-psikolojinin as\u0131l amac\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fcde bulunma ve a\u00e7\u0131klama yapmak (Churchland, 1981; Dennett, 1987) veya sosyal y\u00f6nlendirme (McGeer, 2007; Zawidzki, 2008) olup olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131nda hemfikir de\u011filseler de, her iki gelenek de zihinsel konseptlerin folk-psikolojik kullan\u0131m\u0131nda farkl\u0131 i\u015flevlerin yatt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kabul ederler (Andrews, 2015). <strong>Yani insanlar\u0131n folk-psikolojik ba\u011flamlarda niyetleri \u201cnet olarak tan\u0131mlanabilen, nispeten basit, ba\u011flamdan kopuk ve bunlar\u0131n daha sonraki eylemlere neden olan \u015feyler\u201d olarak tan\u0131mlad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnd\u00fcrten pek bir gerek\u00e7e yoktur<\/strong> (Uithol vd., 2014, s. 130). \u015eimdi g\u00f6sterece\u011fim \u00fczere bu tan\u0131m hem nedensel eylem kuram\u0131 hem de i\u015flevselcilik i\u00e7indeki kuramsal yakla\u015f\u0131mlara dayan\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nedensel eylem kuram\u0131 (Aguilar ve Buckareff, 2010), 1960\u2019lar\u0131n analitik felsefe \u00e7evrelerinde geli\u015ftirilmi\u015ftir. <strong>Bu teori, o d\u00f6nemde yayg\u0131n olan <em>eylemleri bir gerek\u00e7eye (reason) ba\u011flay\u0131p, eylemleri bunun \u00fczerinden a\u00e7\u0131klayan ve bunu yaparken de ki\u015finin amac\u0131n\u0131 anlamaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fe <\/em>bir yan\u0131t olarak ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r<\/strong> (Anscombe, 1957). Davidson (1963), me\u015fhur \u201c<em>Actions, reasons and causes (Eylemler, gerek\u00e7eler ve nedenler)<\/em>\u201d adl\u0131 makalesinde, bu a\u00e7\u0131klaman\u0131n yeterli olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131na de\u011finmi\u015ftir. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc bir eylemi yapmak i\u00e7in birden fazla nedenimiz olabilir, fakat sahici bir a\u00e7\u0131klama ki\u015finin o eylemi ger\u00e7ekte hangi spesifik gerek\u00e7eyle yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 belirleyebiilmelidir <strong>Davidson\u2019a g\u00f6re, bir eylemi ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmenizin as\u0131l gerek\u00e7esi, o eylemi ger\u00e7ekten ortaya \u00e7\u0131karan nedendir<\/strong>. <strong>Yani rasyonel<\/strong> <a href=\"#_ftn6\">[6]<\/a> <strong>olan a\u00e7\u0131klama, ayn\u0131 zamanda nedensel olan a\u00e7\u0131klamad\u0131r<\/strong>. Daha sonraki bir \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmas\u0131nda Davidson (1978), eylemleri nedensel olarak a\u00e7\u0131klamak i\u00e7in sadece \u201cneden\u201d kavram\u0131n\u0131n yeterli olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131, ayn\u0131 zamanda \u201cniyet\u201d kavram\u0131na da ihtiya\u00e7 oldu\u011funu s\u00f6yler. <strong>B\u00f6ylece niyeti, eylemi<\/strong> (<em> \u00f6rn: X\u2019i yapaca\u011f\u0131m<\/em>) <strong>ba\u015flatan bir zihinsel temsil olarak tan\u0131mlar<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ama nedensel eylem kuram\u0131, felsefede h\u00e2l\u00e2 olduk\u00e7a etkili bir anlay\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen olduk\u00e7a tart\u0131\u015fmal\u0131d\u0131r. Bu yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n iki temel sorunu vard\u0131r. <strong>Birincisi, \u201czihinsel nedensellik (mental causation)\u201d problemidir<\/strong>. E\u011fer nedenler ve niyetler, ger\u00e7ekten -nedensel olarak- bir etki yarat\u0131yorsa, zihinsel bir \u015feyin fiziksel d\u00fcnyay\u0131 nas\u0131l etkiledi\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131klayabilmemiz gerekir (Kim, 2000; Davidson, 2001; Robb ve Heil, 2018). Bunun nas\u0131l m\u00fcmk\u00fcn oldu\u011fu, g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczde zihin felsefesinin en tart\u0131\u015fmal\u0131 konular\u0131ndan biridir. <strong>\u0130kinci sorun ise, Davidson\u2019a g\u00f6re nedenler ve niyetlerin ancak eyleme <em>do\u011fru \u015fekilde <\/em>neden olduklar\u0131nda a\u00e7\u0131klay\u0131c\u0131 olabilmesidir<\/strong>. <strong>Bu ifade, <em>tuhaf ve farkl\u0131 nedensellik<\/em><\/strong> (deviant causation) <strong>i\u00e7eren durumlar\u0131 ayr\u0131 tutmak i\u00e7in ortaya at\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r<\/strong>. Yani zihinsel durumlar\u0131n eylemlere neden oldu\u011fu, ancak bunu <em>tuhaf<\/em> bir \u015fekilde yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 durumlar\u0131&#8230; <strong>Zihinsel s\u00fcre\u00e7lerin eyleme \u201cdo\u011fru \u015fekilde\u201d nas\u0131l sebep oldu\u011funu a\u00e7\u0131klaman\u0131n son derece zor oldu\u011fu anla\u015f\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r<\/strong> (baz\u0131 denemeler i\u00e7in bkz. Peacocke, 1979; Sehon, 1997; Stout, 2010; Hyman, 2014). Hatta Davidson bile bu sorunun \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclemeyece\u011fi sonucuna varm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r (Davidson, 2001). Bu soru i\u015faretlerinin devam etmesi nedeniyle, son yirmi y\u0131lda eylemleri a\u00e7\u0131klamak i\u00e7in, nedensel olmayan yakla\u015f\u0131mlara olan e\u011filim artm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r (Baker, 1989; Thompson, 2008; Aguilar ve Buckareff, 2010; Ford vd., 2011).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Nedensel eylem kuram\u0131na artan ilgi, i\u015flevselci paradigma<\/strong> (functionalist paradigm) <strong>ile beraber geli\u015fmi\u015ftir.<\/strong> <strong>\u0130\u015flevselcilik<\/strong> (functionalism)<strong>, davran\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131l\u0131\u011fa<\/strong> (behaviorism) <strong>kar\u015f\u0131 ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r ve zihinsel durumlar\u0131 tan\u0131mlarken onlar\u0131n hangi yap\u0131lardan olu\u015ftu\u011funa ya da hangi maddeden yap\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131na bakmaz<\/strong>. <strong>Daha \u00e7ok bu zihinsel durumlar\u0131n, bili\u015fsel bir sistemde hangi <em>i\u015flevleri<\/em> yerine getirdiklerine dikkat \u00e7eker<\/strong> (Armstrong, 1981; Fodor, 1985; Heras-Escribano, 2019). \u00d6rne\u011fin <em>niyet<\/em> dedi\u011fimiz zihinsel durumlar, ki\u015finin belirli bir eyleme ba\u011fl\u0131 kalmas\u0131n\u0131 (commitment) <a href=\"#_ftn7\">[7]<\/a> ve o y\u00f6nde hareket etmesini sa\u011flar. Bundan \u00f6t\u00fcr\u00fc, <strong>i\u015flevselcili\u011fin temel fikirlerinden biri, zihinsel durumlar\u0131n \u00e7oklu ger\u00e7ekle\u015febilirli\u011fidir<\/strong>. <strong>Bir durumun niyet, inan\u00e7 ya da arzu olarak adland\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 belirleyen \u015fey, nas\u0131l ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131\u011f\u0131 de\u011fil, sistem i\u00e7inde hangi i\u015flevi g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcd\u00fcr<\/strong> <a href=\"#_ftn8\" data-type=\"internal\" data-id=\"#_ftn8\">[8]<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ancak klasik i\u015flevselcilik, uzun s\u00fcredir zihinsel durumlar\u0131n, i\u00e7sel temsiller olarak ele al\u0131nmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fi fikrine ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131 kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r(Fodor, 1985). \u0130\u015flevselcili\u011fin, bili\u015fsel bilim ve n\u00f6robilimin temelinde yatt\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00f6ylenebilecekse de, \u015fu anki haliyle o da en az nedensel eylem kuram\u0131 kadar tart\u0131\u015fmal\u0131d\u0131r. Bu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fe yap\u0131lan en \u00f6nemli ele\u015ftiri, durumsal bili\u015f (situated cognition) yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131 i\u00e7inde \u015fekillenmi\u015ftir (Clark ve Chalmers, 1998; Bechtel, 2009; Hutto, 2013; Varela vd., 2017). Bu yakla\u015f\u0131m, klasik i\u015flevselci bak\u0131\u015f\u0131n, bili\u015fin \u00e7ok temel baz\u0131 \u00f6zelliklerini a\u00e7\u0131klamada yetersiz kald\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6yler. <strong>\u0130\u015flevselci paradigma, bili\u015fin de\u011fi\u015fkenli\u011fini, ba\u011flama olan duyarl\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131, bili\u015f ile bedenin s\u00fcrekli etkile\u015fimini ve alg\u0131 ile eylemin birbirinden ayr\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fclememesi gibi \u00f6zellikleri a\u00e7\u0131klamakta yetersiz kal\u0131r<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Elbette bu y\u00fczeysel a\u00e7\u0131klamalar, ne nedensel eylem kuram\u0131n\u0131 ne de i\u015flevselcili\u011fi kapsaml\u0131 analizini sunar. Ancak burada g\u00f6stermeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131m \u015fey \u015fu ki, <strong>her iki yakla\u015f\u0131m da pek \u00e7ok a\u00e7\u0131dan faydal\u0131 ve etkili olsa da, teorik olarak ele\u015ftirilmeye a\u00e7\u0131k olduklar\u0131d\u0131r<\/strong>. Niyeti bilimsel olarak incelemek i\u00e7in gereken kuramsal \u00e7er\u00e7eve, hen\u00fcz tamamlanm\u0131\u015f olmaktan \u00e7ok uzakt\u0131r. Ayr\u0131ca, folk-psikolojinin bize niyetleri \u00e7ok farkl\u0131 bi\u00e7imlerde anlayabilmemiz i\u00e7in bir alan a\u00e7t\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 da g\u00f6stermi\u015f oldum. Bu yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131m de\u011ferlendirmeler ve \u00f6zellikle de Uithol\u2019un niyet hakk\u0131nda \u00e7izdi\u011fi karamsar tablo g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcne al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, niyeti a\u00e7\u0131klaman\u0131n alternatif yollar\u0131 olabilece\u011fini g\u00f6r\u00fcr\u00fcz.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:35px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size:30px\"><strong>3. Niyetler Hakkk\u0131nda Alternatif Bir D\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnme \u015eekli <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:35px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Bu makalenin geri kalan\u0131nda, niyeti anlamaya y\u00f6nelik alternatif bir yakla\u015f\u0131m sunmak istiyorum<\/strong>. \u00d6nerece\u011fim yakla\u015f\u0131m, bir\u00e7ok n\u00f6robilimci ve psikolo\u011fa olduk\u00e7a radikal, anti-nat\u00fcralist ve hatta biraz g\u00fcl\u00fcn\u00e7 gelebilir. K\u0131saca \u015f\u00f6yle \u00f6zetleyebilirim: <strong>Niyet \u201cne zihinsel bir durum, ne arzu ve inan\u00e7lar\u0131n bir birle\u015fimi ya da ba\u015fka herhangi bir \u015fey\u201d olmayabilir<\/strong> (Scheer, 2004). Getirdi\u011fim bu alternatif yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n, \u00f6nemli \u00fc\u00e7 tane avantaj\u0131 oldu\u011funu g\u00f6stermek istiyorum. <strong>Birincisi, hem nedensel eylem kuram\u0131n\u0131n hem de i\u015flevselcili\u011fin tekrar tekrar kar\u015f\u0131la\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 sorunlarla kar\u015f\u0131la\u015fmaz<\/strong>. <strong>\u0130kincisi, folk-psikolojideki niyet kavram\u0131n\u0131n anlam farkl\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131na makul bir a\u00e7\u0131klama getirir<\/strong>. <strong>\u00dc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fcs\u00fc ise, Uithol ve \u00e7al\u0131\u015fma arkada\u015flar\u0131n\u0131n s\u00f6z\u00fcn\u00fc etti\u011fi \u201cneden niyetin n\u00f6ral e\u015flenikleri olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131\u201d a\u00e7\u0131klamak i\u00e7in farkl\u0131 bir yol sunar<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u00d6nerdi\u011fim alternatif bak\u0131\u015f a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131na g\u00f6re, \u201cniyet\u201d ve \u201cniyet etmek\u201d gibi terimleri, insan\u0131n hangi<\/strong> (ge\u00e7mi\u015f, mevcut ve gelecekteki) <strong>eylemlere kendini verdi\u011fini<\/strong> (commit) <strong>ifade etmek i\u00e7in kullan\u0131r\u0131z<\/strong>. <strong>Bu niyet anlay\u0131\u015f\u0131, Wittgenstein\u2019\u0131n<\/strong> (1953) <strong>ge\u00e7 d\u00f6neminde geli\u015ftirdi\u011fi psikoloji felsefesine dayan\u0131r ve ayr\u0131ca Anscombe\u2019un <em>Intention<\/em><\/strong> (1957) <strong>adl\u0131 \u00fcnl\u00fc kitab\u0131nda sundu\u011fu analizlerle de paraleldir, ki bu yakla\u015f\u0131m son y\u0131llarda insanlar\u0131n eylemlerini a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131 bak\u0131m\u0131ndan yeniden \u00f6nem kazanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r<\/strong> (Vogler, 2001; Thompson, 2008; Ford vd., 2011; Van Miltenburg, 2011; Tanney, 2018). Bu yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n, folk-psikolojideki niyeti daha iyi anlamam\u0131za nas\u0131l yard\u0131mc\u0131 olaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 da g\u00f6sterece\u011fim. Ayr\u0131ca bu yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n, Uithol ve arkada\u015flar\u0131n\u0131n s\u00f6z etti\u011fi n\u00f6robilimsel bulgular\u0131 sadece \u00f6ng\u00f6rmekle kalmay\u0131p bu bulgular i\u00e7in teorik bir a\u00e7\u0131klama sunabilece\u011fini de g\u00f6sterece\u011fim. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Nedensel eylem kuram\u0131 ve i\u015flevselcilik gibi yakla\u015f\u0131mlar bili\u015fsel bilimde, bir \u015feyi ortaya \u00e7\u0131karan nedensel s\u00fcre\u00e7lere bakarak belli a\u00e7\u0131klamalar yapmay\u0131 gerektirir<\/strong>. <strong>Wittgensteinc\u0131 yakla\u015f\u0131ma g\u00f6re, bu aray\u0131\u015f ne yaz\u0131k ki zihnimizin baz\u0131 y\u00f6nlerini \u201c\u015feyle\u015ftirmeye\u201d<\/strong> (yani nesne gibi d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmeye) <strong>yol a\u00e7m\u0131\u015ft\u0131r, oysa bu y\u00f6nler asl\u0131nda b\u00f6yle bir nesnele\u015ftirmeye uygun de\u011fildir<\/strong>. Gilbert Ryle, Wittgenstein ile paralel olarak bu fikri <em>The Concept of Mind<\/em> adl\u0131 eserinde ayr\u0131nt\u0131l\u0131 bi\u00e7imde geli\u015ftirmi\u015ftir (Ryle, 1949). <strong>Ryle burada, zihin felsefecilerinin zihnin ayr\u0131 bir madde oldu\u011funu savunan Kartezyen (Descartes\u2019a ait) fikri reddetmi\u015f olsalar bile, \u00f6nemli bir detay\u0131 g\u00f6zden ka\u00e7\u0131rd\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 savunur: \u201czihin\u201d kavram\u0131, \u201cmadde\u201d kavram\u0131ndan tamamen farkl\u0131 bir d\u00fczeye aittir.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Bunun yerine ula\u015ft\u0131klar\u0131 yanl\u0131\u015f sonu\u00e7, zihnin <em>s\u0131radan<\/em> bir fiziksel madde oldu\u011fu ve zihinsel kavramlar\u0131n tamamen fiziksel s\u00fcre\u00e7lerle a\u00e7\u0131klanabilece\u011fidir<\/strong> (Ryle, 1949, s. 22). <strong>Niyetlerden \u201cdurumlar\u201d ve \u201cs\u00fcre\u00e7ler\u201d olarak bahsederek, onlar\u0131n asl\u0131nda beynin i\u00e7inde ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen belirli olaylar oldu\u011fu kan\u0131s\u0131na s\u00fcr\u00fcklenmi\u015fizdir. <\/strong>Wittgenstein\u2019\u0131n da s\u00f6yledi\u011fi gibi:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cZihinsel s\u00fcre\u00e7ler ve durumlarla ilgili felsefi problem [&#8230;] nas\u0131l ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r? Bu noktada at\u0131lan ilk ad\u0131m hep g\u00f6zden ka\u00e7\u0131r\u0131l\u0131r. Baz\u0131 s\u00fcre\u00e7lerden ve durumlardan bahsederiz ama asl\u0131nda bunlar\u0131n ne oldu\u011funu belirsiz b\u0131rak\u0131r\u0131z.&nbsp; Belki bir g\u00fcn onlar hakk\u0131nda daha fazla fikrimiz olaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcr\u00fcz. Fakat tam da bu asl\u0131nda \u00e7oktan belli bir bak\u0131\u015f a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131na bizi hapsetmi\u015ftir [\u2026] (Yani sihirbaz g\u00f6sterisinde hileli hamleyi oynam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r bileoysa biz bu hamlenin masum oldu\u011funu sanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131k).\u201d (<em>Felsefi Soru\u015fturmalar<\/em>, 308).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-pullquote\"><blockquote><p>&#8220;Niyetlerden \u201cdurumlar\u201d ve \u201cs\u00fcre\u00e7ler\u201d olarak bahsederek, onlar\u0131n asl\u0131nda beynin i\u00e7inde ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen belirli olaylar oldu\u011fu kan\u0131s\u0131na s\u00fcr\u00fcklenmi\u015fizdir.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Ancak Wittgensteinc\u0131 ve Rylec\u0131 perspektiften, zihinsel kavramlar\u0131n beyinde ayr\u0131 ayr\u0131 \u201cdurumlar\u201d ya da \u201cs\u00fcre\u00e7ler\u201d olarak bulundu\u011fu birka\u00e7 felsefi sebeple \u015f\u00fcphelidir<\/strong>. Ryle, <em>The Concept of Mind<\/em> adl\u0131 kitab\u0131n\u0131n isten\u00e7 (will) b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcnde, <strong>\u201cbir \u015feyi yapma niyetinde olman\u0131n\u201d<\/strong> (Ryle burada \u00e7o\u011funlukla \u201cvolition (irade) <a href=\"#_ftn9\" data-type=\"internal\" data-id=\"#_ftn9\">[9]<\/a>\u201d terimini kullan\u0131r), <strong>herhangi bir niyet etme ya da isten\u00e7 (will) an\u0131n\u0131n ortaya \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f\u0131na anlaml\u0131 \u015fekilde g\u00f6nderimde<\/strong> (reference) <strong>bulunamayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 savunur:<\/strong> \u201cHi\u00e7 kimse sabah 10\u2019da \u015fu ya da bu \u015feye<em> irade g\u00f6stermekle me\u015fgul oldu\u011funu y<\/em>a da \u00f6\u011fleye kadar be\u015f h\u0131zl\u0131 ve kolay, iki de yava\u015f ve zor irade eylemi g\u00f6sterdi\u011fini s\u00f6ylemez\u201d (Ryle, 1949, s. 64). Wittgenstein\u2019\u0131n <em>Philosophical Investigations<\/em> adl\u0131 eserinde de benzer fikirler bulunur ve bu fikirler Scheer (2004) taraf\u0131ndan da geli\u015ftirilmi\u015ftir. <strong>Scheer\u2019e g\u00f6re, niyetlere yo\u011funluk ya da s\u00fcre gibi \u00f6zellikler atfetmeyiz, oysa bunlar\u0131 zihinsel durumlar i\u00e7in kullanmak do\u011fald\u0131r<\/strong>. \u00d6rne\u011fin \u201cCharles\u2019\u0131n partiye gitme niyeti, e\u015fininkinden iki kat fazlayd\u0131\u201d gibi bir \u015fey s\u00f6ylemeyiz. Yine, \u201cCharles\u2019\u0131n saat 17.00 ile 20.00 aras\u0131nda partiye gitmeye niyeti vard\u0131, sonra niyetini de\u011fi\u015ftirdi\u201d <a href=\"#_ftn10\">[10]<\/a> gibi c\u00fcmleler de kullanmay\u0131z. Scheer\u2019in geli\u015ftirdi\u011fi ikinci arg\u00fcman ise \u015fudur: Niyeti bir \u201cba\u011fl\u0131l\u0131k\u201d (commitment) olarak g\u00f6r\u00fcr\u00fcz. Ama e\u011fer niyetleri davran\u0131\u015flar\u0131m\u0131z\u0131 ba\u015flatan nedensel durumlar gibi g\u00f6r\u00fcrsek, niyeti bir \u201cba\u011fl\u0131l\u0131k (commitment)\u201d olarak de\u011ferlendirmek zorla\u015f\u0131r. <strong>Niyet (intention) ile ba\u011fl\u0131l\u0131k (commitment) aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fki, mesela bir arabay\u0131 y\u0131kama niyetimiz oldu\u011funda, bunun, daha g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc ba\u015fka bir sebep ortaya \u00e7\u0131k\u0131p da bunu de\u011fi\u015ftirene kadar arabay\u0131 y\u0131kayaca\u011f\u0131m\u0131za <em>inand\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131z<\/em> anlam\u0131na gelmesidir<\/strong>.<strong> Ancak nedensel g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fe g\u00f6re, \u201cniyetim var\u201d demek, asl\u0131nda zihinsel olarak ne yapaca\u011f\u0131ma dair tahmin y\u00fcr\u00fctmekten \u00f6te bir anlama gelmez<\/strong> (Scheer, 2004). Bu da <em>ki\u015finin arabay\u0131 y\u0131kayaca\u011f\u0131na inanmasa da onu y\u0131kamaya niyeti oldu\u011fu <\/em>ihtimaline alan a\u00e7ar (Bratman, 1987\u2019de incelenmi\u015ftir). \u00d6rne\u011fin, bu t\u00fcr i\u015fleri unutmaya yatk\u0131n oldu\u011funu biliyor olabilir.<strong> Bu durum, niyet ile<\/strong> (yap\u0131lacak eyleme)<strong> ba\u011fl\u0131l\u0131k <\/strong>(commitment) <strong>aras\u0131ndaki, Scheer ve bir\u00e7ok d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcr\u00fcn zaruri<\/strong> (essential) <strong>buldu\u011fu ili\u015fkiyi kopar\u0131r<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Peki e\u011fer niyetler beyinde ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen ayr\u0131\u015f\u0131k durumlar ya da s\u00fcre\u00e7ler <em>de\u011filse<\/em>, o zaman tam olarak nedirler? Scheer, \u201cba\u011fl\u0131l\u0131k\u201d (commitment) kavram\u0131n\u0131 ortaya atarak \u00f6nemli bir noktaya parmak basm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r ama bu kavram\u0131n niyeti a\u00e7\u0131klamadaki \u00f6nemine dair herhangi bir arg\u00fcman sunmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Scheer\u2019in \u00f6nerilerini bir ad\u0131m ileri ta\u015f\u0131yarak, niyet ile ba\u011fl\u0131l\u0131k (commitment) aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkinin hayati oldu\u011funu, \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc niyetin folk-psikolojide g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc ve nedensel\/i\u015flevselci bak\u0131\u015f\u0131n kavrayamad\u0131\u011f\u0131 baz\u0131 roller oldu\u011funu \u00f6ne s\u00fcr\u00fcyorum. Daha a\u00e7\u0131k s\u00f6ylemek gerekirse, <strong>folk-psikolojide niyetten s\u00f6z etti\u011fimizde asl\u0131nda yapmaya niyet etti\u011fimiz \u015feye dair bir t\u00fcr birinci-\u015fah\u0131s perspektifinden <em>ba\u011fl\u0131l\u0131k <\/em><\/strong>(commitment) <strong>ifade ederiz<\/strong>. <strong>Ba\u015fkalar\u0131 bize niyet atfetti\u011finde de, onlar bize b\u00f6yle bir ba\u011fl\u0131l\u0131k<\/strong> (commitment) <strong>atfetmi\u015f olurlar<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Buradaki temel nokta \u015fu ki, b\u00f6yle bir \u201cba\u011fl\u0131l\u0131k\u201d, <em>normatif<\/em> <em>bir tutum<\/em> i\u00e7erir<\/strong>. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc bu t\u00fcr ifade ve at\u0131flar\u0131, ba\u015fkalar\u0131ndan ve kendimizden neler bekleyebilece\u011fimizi belirlemek i\u00e7in ederiz (Moran, 2001). Bu da folk-psikolojik niyet nosyonunun en az\u0131ndan k\u0131smen normatif bir nosyon oldu\u011funu i\u015faret eder. <strong>Yani niyeti sadece davran\u0131\u015f\u0131 tahmin etmek veya a\u00e7\u0131klamak i\u00e7in de\u011fil, ayn\u0131 zamanda davran\u0131\u015f\u0131 de\u011ferlendirmek ve y\u00f6nlendirmek i\u00e7in de kullan\u0131r\u0131z<\/strong>. Bu sosyal y\u00f6nlendirmenin folk-psikolojinin temel bir i\u015flevi oldu\u011fu fikri yak\u0131n zamanda felsefi olarak daha detayl\u0131 bi\u00e7imde McGeer (2007, 2008, 2015) ve Zawidzki (2008) taraf\u0131ndan geli\u015ftirilmi\u015ftir. <strong>Onlara g\u00f6re, ba\u015fkalar\u0131na ya da kendimize belli folk-psikolojik zihinsel durumlar atfetti\u011fimizde, bunu sadece davran\u0131\u015flar\u0131 tahmin etmek i\u00e7in yapmay\u0131z<\/strong>. <strong>Ayn\u0131 zamanda davran\u0131\u015f\u0131 \u015fekillendirmeye de \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131r\u0131z<\/strong>. <strong>Birbirimizi ikna eder, te\u015fvik eder, uyar\u0131r, ele\u015ftirir ya da birbirimize s\u00f6zler veririz<\/strong>. <strong>B\u00f6ylece hem kendimizde hem de ba\u015fkalar\u0131nda anla\u015f\u0131l\u0131r ve d\u00fczenli davran\u0131\u015f \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcleri olu\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flar\u0131z<\/strong> (McGeer, 2007, s. 149).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Bu niyet anlay\u0131\u015f\u0131, nedenselci\/i\u015flevselci yakla\u015f\u0131mla a\u00e7\u0131klanamaz<\/strong>. <strong>\u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc niyetler normatif beklentileri ifade ettikleri <em>s\u00fcrece ve o \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde<\/em> ge\u00e7mi\u015f nedenlere g\u00f6nderimde bulunmazlar<\/strong>. <strong>Hatta, asl\u0131nda, hi\u00e7bir \u015feye g\u00f6nderimde bulunmazlar<\/strong>. \u0130\u015fte Sheer\u2019\u0131n niyetin ne bir zihinsel durum ne de arzu ve inan\u00e7lar\u0131n bir kombinasyonu yahut ba\u015fka herhangi bir \u015fey olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 vecizesi tam da bu \u015fekilde anla\u015f\u0131lmal\u0131d\u0131r (Scheer, 2004).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Fakat bu, gelecek hafta bir partiye gitmeye niyeti oldu\u011funu&nbsp;d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcm\u00fcz Charles ile b\u00f6yle bir niyeti olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcm\u00fcz Jane aras\u0131ndaki fark nedir sorusunu do\u011furur. Niyetlerden bahsetmenin \u00e7o\u011fu zaman asl\u0131nda beklentilerimizi ifade etme bi\u00e7imi oldu\u011funu kabul etsek bile, bu beklentiler ancak ki\u015finin <em>ger\u00e7ekten o i\u015fe \u201cba\u011fl\u0131\u201d<\/em> (committed) oldu\u011fu durumda anlaml\u0131d\u0131r. \u00d6yleyse \u015fu soruya cevap vermemiz gerekiyor: Birine (ya da kendimize) niyet atfetmek ne zaman ge\u00e7erli olur? Birinin \u201cniyetim var\u201d demesi, o niyetin varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kan\u0131tl\u0131yor olamaz. Wittgenstein\u2019\u0131n da s\u00f6yledi\u011fi gibi: \u201cniyetin a\u00e7\u0131kca ifadesi edilmesi bile tek ba\u015f\u0131na niyet i\u00e7in yeterli bir delil de\u011fildir\u201d (Wittgenstein, 1953, s. 641). <strong>A\u015fa\u011f\u0131da a\u00e7\u0131klayaca\u011f\u0131m gibi, buna getirilen Wittgensteinc\u0131 cevap<\/strong> (ki bunun farkl\u0131 bir versiyonu Dennett, 1991\u2019de bulunur)<strong> niyet atfetmenin asl\u0131nda bir \u00e7e\u015fit \u201c\u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fc tan\u0131ma\u201d oldu\u011fudur, ki bu da bir ki\u015finin <em>ancak ve <\/em>ancak d\u00fcnyada belli bir \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fc mevcutsa niyet sahibi oldu\u011fu kriterine yol a\u00e7ar<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:35px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size:30px\"><strong>4. Niyetler ve \u00d6r\u00fcnt\u00fcler<\/strong><a id=\"_msocom_1\"><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:35px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Wittgensteinc\u0131 yakla\u015f\u0131ma g\u00f6re, \u201cCharles \u00f6n\u00fcm\u00fczdeki hafta partiye gitmeye niyetli\u201d diyebilmemiz, ancak belli bir fenomen \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcs\u00fc, uzay ve zamana da\u011f\u0131lm\u0131\u015f bir \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fc, d\u00fcnyada mevcutsa do\u011frudur<\/strong>&nbsp;(Wittgenstein, 1982; Ter Hark, 2001). \u201c\u00d6r\u00fcnt\u00fc\u201d (pattern) kavram\u0131, zihinsel durumlar\u0131 belli olaylar kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda ortaya \u00e7\u0131kabilecek davran\u0131\u015f e\u011filimleriyle (dispositional) a\u00e7\u0131klayan yakla\u015f\u0131mlarla benzerlik g\u00f6sterir (Gilbert Ryle, 1949; Schwitzgebel, 2013; Tumulty, 2014). <strong>Fakat \u00f6nemli bir fark, Wittengensteinc\u0131 yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n metafiziksel olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 barizdir<\/strong>. <strong>E\u011filimciler<\/strong> (disposionalists)<strong>, niyetleri bu e\u011filimsel \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fclerle <em>\u00f6zde\u015fle\u015ftirir<\/em><\/strong>. <strong>Wittgenstein\u2019a g\u00f6reyse, biz e\u011fer \u201cCharles\u2019\u0131n partiye gitmeye niyeti oldu\u011funu\u201d iddia ediyorsak, asl\u0131nda sadece d\u00fcnyada belli bir \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcn\u00fcn mevcudiyetinden bahsediyoruzdur fakat bu \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fc niyetin kendisi de\u011fildir<\/strong> (Ter Hark, 2001). Bu nokta \u00e7ok \u00f6nemlidir ve bize \u015funu g\u00f6sterir: <strong>Wittengensteinc\u0131 perspektifinden bakt\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131zda, niyetler hi\u00e7bir \u015feye neden olmaz.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Niyet at\u0131flar\u0131yla ilgili olabilecek bu kabilden bir \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcn\u00fcn neye benzedi\u011fini serimlemek i\u00e7in, b\u00f6ylesi bir \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcyle alakal\u0131 baz\u0131 \u201c\u00f6\u011feleri\u201d \u00f6rneklendirece\u011fim. Mesela, Charles\u2019\u0131n, parti i\u00e7in haz\u0131rl\u0131k yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131, o ak\u015fam i\u00e7in \u00e7ak\u0131\u015fan ba\u015fka bir plan yapmad\u0131\u011f\u0131, partiye dair birtak\u0131m hisler duyumsad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve birtak\u0131m sorulara (\u201chediye ald\u0131n m\u0131?\u201d) belli ba\u015fl\u0131 \u015fekillerde yan\u0131t verdi\u011fi s\u00fcrece ve bu takdirde partiye gitmeye niyetlidir. Bu eskiz mahiyetindeki listeden hareketle birka\u00e7 \u015fey hemencecik netle\u015fir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u00d6ncelikle, Charles\u2019\u0131n bir niyeti oldu\u011funu s\u00f6ylememize neden olan \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fc net de\u011fildir<\/strong>. <strong>Net olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi, pek \u00e7ok farkl\u0131 unsur i\u00e7erir<\/strong>. <strong>Bu unsurlar\u0131n hi\u00e7biri tek ba\u015f\u0131na belirleyici de\u011fildir<\/strong>. Ayr\u0131ca \u00e7o\u011fu zaman baz\u0131 unsurlar eksik de olabilir (\u00f6rne\u011fin, Charles yanl\u0131\u015fl\u0131kla takviminde ba\u015fka bir g\u00fcnle kar\u0131\u015ft\u0131r\u0131p o ak\u015fama ba\u015fka bir plan yapabilir). <strong>Buna ra\u011fmen yine de bir niyetten s\u00f6z edebilmemiz i\u00e7in bu \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcn\u00fcn belli bir d\u00fczeyde mevcut olmas\u0131 \u015fartt\u0131r<\/strong>.&nbsp;<strong>E\u011filimsel inan\u00e7 yakla\u015f\u0131mlar\u0131nda oldu\u011fu gibi, niyetlerde de net olmayan bir gri alan olacakt\u0131r, yani insanlar\u0131n \u201ctam olarak\u201d niyet ettikleri de\u011fil, Eric Schwitzgebel\u2019in ifadesiyle, \u201carada kalm\u0131\u015f\u201d<\/strong> (in-between) <strong>niyetleri olabilir<\/strong> (Schwitzgebel, 2002, 2013). Bu t\u00fcr arada kalm\u0131\u015f (in-between) durumlarda, (\u00f6rne\u011fin, Charles s\u00fcrekli partiye gidece\u011fini s\u00f6yl\u00fcyor ama hi\u00e7bir haz\u0131rl\u0131k yapm\u0131yor ve partiye gitmeyi s\u00fcrekli unutuyorsa), Charles\u2019\u0131n partiye gitmeye niyeti olup olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131na dair ortada net ve kesin bir veri yoktur; yani durum belirlenemezdir (indeterminate). <strong>Wittengensteinc\u0131 baz\u0131 filozoflar bu gibi belirlenemezliklerin kuramda bir zay\u0131f te\u015fkil etmedi\u011fini, aksine bu belirlenemezli\u011fin<\/strong> (indeterminacy) <strong>zihinselli\u011fe i\u00e7kin bir \u00f6zellik oldu\u011funu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnm\u00fc\u015flerdir<\/strong> (McDowell, 1992; Ammereller, 2001; Ter Hark, 2001, Child, 2011).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Birinin \u015fu veya bu niyete sahip olu\u015funu \u201cdo\u011fru\u201d k\u0131lan \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcn\u00fcn zamana yay\u0131lm\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131, ayn\u0131 zamanda o ki\u015finin o niyete sahip olup olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n ancak <em>zamanla<\/em> netle\u015febilece\u011fi anlam\u0131na da gelir<\/strong>. Wittgenstein da beklenti (expectation) kavram\u0131 hakk\u0131nda benzer bir noktaya dikkat \u00e7eker:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cE\u011fer \u2018B\u00fct\u00fcn g\u00fcn onu bekliyordum\u2019 dedi\u011fimde, buradaki \u2018beklemek\u2019, i\u00e7inde beklenen ki\u015fiyi ve onun geli\u015fini (t\u0131pk\u0131 hamurun un, \u015feker ve yumurtay\u0131 bir macun gibi kar\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015f halde i\u00e7ermesi gibi) bile\u015fen olarak bar\u0131nd\u0131ran s\u00fcre\u011fen bir durum anlam\u0131na gelmez. Beklemeyi olu\u015fturan \u015fey, bir dizi eylem, d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnce ve duygudur.\u201d (Wittgenstein, 1974, s. 141)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-pullquote\"><blockquote><p>&#8220;Birinin \u015fu veya bu niyete sahip olu\u015funu \u201cdo\u011fru\u201d k\u0131lan \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcn\u00fcn zamana yay\u0131lm\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131, ayn\u0131 zamanda o ki\u015finin o niyete sahip olup olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n ancak <em>zamanla<\/em> netle\u015febilece\u011fi anlam\u0131na da gelir.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Bu da, \u00e7ok k\u0131sa bir zaman dilimi i\u00e7inde bir niyete sahip olman\u0131n m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6sterir<\/strong>. Wittgenstein, bunun t\u00fcm mental konseptler i\u00e7in ge\u00e7erli oldu\u011funu s\u00f6yler ve a\u015fkla ilgili \u015f\u00f6yle bir \u00f6rnek verir: \u201cBir insan bir anl\u0131\u011f\u0131na bile olsa &#8211; \u00f6nce veya sonra ne ya\u015fand\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z olarak-&nbsp; yo\u011fun bir a\u015fk ve umut hissedebilir mi? \u015eu anda olan bir \u015fey, bulundu\u011fu ba\u011flam i\u00e7erisinde bir anlam kazan\u0131r. Onu \u00f6nemli k\u0131lan, i\u00e7inde bulundu\u011fu ko\u015fullard\u0131r\u201d (Wittgenstein, 1953, s. 583). <strong>Niyetin tek bir an i\u00e7inde var olmaktan \u00e7ok, zamana yay\u0131lan bir do\u011fas\u0131 oldu\u011funu s\u00f6ylemek ilk etapta kula\u011fa ilgin\u00e7 gelebilir<\/strong>. <strong>Zihinsel kavramlara genel olarak bakt\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131zda, niyet sanki \u201czamanda tek bir an i\u00e7ine s\u0131k\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015f\u201d gibi g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcr: yani karar vermek ve eyleme ge\u00e7mek aras\u0131ndaki o k\u0131sa ana<\/strong>. <strong>Ama Wittgenstein, birinin ger\u00e7ek niyetini ancak ve ancak o ki\u015finin ge\u00e7mi\u015fine (nas\u0131l karar verip davrand\u0131\u011f\u0131na) ve gelece\u011fine (sonras\u0131nda ne s\u00f6yleyip neyi yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131na) bakarak anlayabilece\u011fimizi s\u00f6yler<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-pullquote\"><blockquote><p>\u201cBir insan bir anl\u0131\u011f\u0131na bile olsa &#8211; \u00f6nce veya sonra ne ya\u015fand\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z olarak &#8211; yo\u011fun bir a\u015fk ve umut hissedebilir mi? \u015eu anda olan bir \u015fey, bulundu\u011fu ba\u011flam i\u00e7erisinde bir anlam kazan\u0131r. Onu \u00f6nemli k\u0131lan, i\u00e7inde bulundu\u011fu ko\u015fullard\u0131r\u201d<\/p><cite>Ludwig Wittgenstein<\/cite><\/blockquote><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">N\u00f6robilim \u00e7er\u00e7evesinden bakt\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131zda, niyetleri kavray\u0131\u015f\u0131m\u0131za dair bu de\u011ferlendirme, niyetin asl\u0131nda var olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 anlam\u0131na gelmiyor mu? Ya niyet sadece lafta kalan bir kavramsa? <strong>Asl\u0131nda Wittgenstein&#8217;\u0131n perspektifinden bakt\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131zda, niyetler ger\u00e7ekten de yoktur. Yani niyetler birer \u201d\u015fey\u201d de\u011fildirler<\/strong>. <strong>Bir sandalye, y\u0131ld\u0131zlar veya molek\u00fcllerin oldu\u011fu anlamda \u2018ger\u00e7ek\u2019 de\u011fillerdir<\/strong>. Her \u015feye ra\u011fmen, yine de, bir ki\u015finin neye niyeti oldu\u011funa dair <em>birtak\u0131m ger\u00e7ek olgular bulunmas\u0131<\/em> anlam\u0131nda niyet diye bir \u015fey <em>vard\u0131r<\/em>. Bu anlamda Wittengensteinc\u0131lar, insanlar\u0131n niyetlerinin ger\u00e7ekten var oldu\u011funu hala s\u00f6yleyebilirler. Tabii burada bahsetti\u011fimiz, niyetlerin \u00f6rne\u011fin ki\u015finin bir arabas\u0131 olmas\u0131 gibi de\u011fil de, ki\u015finin asabi biri olmas\u0131na benzedi\u011fidir <a href=\"#_ftn11\" data-type=\"internal\" data-id=\"#_ftn11\">[11]<\/a>. &nbsp;Vurgulamam gereken bir nokta da \u015fu ki, bahsetti\u011fim yakla\u015f\u0131m, atfedilmi\u015f niyetler hak\u0131nda atfetme eyleminden ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z bir do\u011fruluk (truth) olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 savunan yorumlamac\u0131 anlay\u0131\u015f\u0131n (interpretivism) bir t\u00fcrevi kesinlikle de\u011fildir (M\u00f6lder, 2010).&nbsp;Aksine, Charles\u2019\u0131n partiye gitmeye niyeti oldu\u011funu s\u00f6ylemek, zaten halihaz\u0131rda bulunan bir \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcy\u00fc tan\u0131mak demektir ve atf\u0131n kendisinden ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zd\u0131r. Bu ayn\u0131 zamanda insanlar\u0131n kendi niyetleriyle ilgili de yan\u0131labileceklerini g\u00f6sterir. <strong>\u00c7imleri bi\u00e7me niyetin oldu\u011funu s\u00f6ylemek, ger\u00e7ekten de buna niyet etti\u011fin anlam\u0131na gelmez yani. Buna <em>ger\u00e7ekten<\/em> niyet edip etmedi\u011fin ilgili \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcn\u00fcn yeterli derece mevcut olup olmamas\u0131na dayan\u0131r.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-pullquote\"><blockquote><p>&#8220;Asl\u0131nda Wittgenstein&#8217;\u0131n perspektifinden bakt\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131zda, niyetler ger\u00e7ekten de yoktur. Yani niyetler birer \u201d\u015fey\u201d de\u011fildirler.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cS\u0131rt\u0131n\u0131 bilime dayayan\u201d (scientifically oriented) pek \u00e7ok felsefeci, hala bu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fc tehlikeli seviyede anti-nat\u00fcralist bulacakt\u0131r. Dennett erken d\u00f6nem yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalarda bir t\u00fcr \u201c\u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fc realizmi\u201d geli\u015ftirmeye yakla\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131 (Dennett, 1991; Ter Hark, 2001). Yine de, Dennett i\u00e7in niyet gibi konseptlerin <em>nedensel olarak etkin<\/em> <em>durumlar<\/em> oldu\u011fu fikri merkezi \u00f6nemdeydi (Slors, 2007). <strong>Sonu\u00e7 olarak, Dennett niyet gibi bir zihinsel durumun bir \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fc ile <em>\u00f6zde\u015fle\u015ftirilmesi<\/em> gerekti\u011fini ve nedensel olarak etkin olan\u0131n \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcn\u00fcn kendisi oldu\u011funu<\/strong> (ki bu noktada ilgili \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fc altta yatan fiziksel durumlar ve s\u00fcre\u00e7lerle&nbsp; a\u00e7\u0131klanabilirdi) <strong>savunmu\u015ftur<\/strong>. <strong>Bunu makul k\u0131labilmek i\u00e7in, Dennett \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcy\u00fc zamansal ve mekansal olarak lokal bi\u00e7imde kavramsalla\u015ft\u0131rm\u0131\u015f ve \u201c\u00e7\u0131plak insan g\u00f6z\u00fcyle kolayca ay\u0131rt edilebilir\u201d olduklar\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6ylemi\u015ftir<\/strong> (Dennett, 1991, s.33). Fakat bu, \u201cE\u011fer Clinton\u2019\u0131n ba\u015fkan oldu\u011funa inanmam i\u00e7in \u00e7\u0131plak g\u00f6zle g\u00f6r\u00fclebilen bedensel hareketle mevcutsa, ben, bunlar\u0131n tamamen cahiliyim\u201d tarz\u0131 sert ele\u015ftirilere kap\u0131 aralam\u0131\u015ft\u0131 (Nelkin, 1994, s. 63). <strong>Dennett\u2019\u0131n yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n Wittgensteinc\u0131 yan\u0131t ise, niyet at\u0131flar\u0131m\u0131z\u0131n uzay ve zamana yay\u0131lm\u0131\u015f \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fclere g\u00f6nderimde bulunas\u0131ndan \u00f6t\u00fcr\u00fc, niyetin \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcn\u00fcn kendisi oldu\u011funu s\u00f6ylemenin anlams\u0131zla\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131, \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc bu durumda zihin durumlar\u0131m\u0131z\u0131n art\u0131k herhangi anlaml\u0131 \u015fekilde \u201cbize ait\u201d olamayacaklar\u0131 olacakt\u0131. Wittgensteinc\u0131lar i\u00e7in, daha mant\u0131kl\u0131 sonu\u00e7, en nihayetinde esasen niyetlerin zihin durumlar\u0131 bile olmad\u0131klar\u0131yd\u0131<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ama bu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f, niyet kavram\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan belki de en \u00f6nemli \u00f6zelli\u011fi, niyetlerin insan davran\u0131\u015f\u0131na olan etkisini g\u00f6z ard\u0131 etmiyor mu? Bu makalenin kapsam\u0131 nedensellik \u00fczerine ayr\u0131nt\u0131l\u0131 bir tart\u0131\u015fmaya izin vermese de Wittgensteinc\u0131 cevap \u015fudur: <strong>E\u011fer niyetler zihinsel durumlar de\u011filse, tabii ki de hi\u00e7bir \u015feye neden olamazlar<\/strong> (Scheer, 2004). <strong>Bu, insan eylemlerini anlamland\u0131rabilmek i\u00e7in, Wittgensteinc\u0131 niyet kavram\u0131n\u0131n insan eyleyicilere<\/strong> (agent) <strong>nedensel kuvvetler atfedebilece\u011fimiz bir nedensellik nosyonu gerektirdi\u011fi anlam\u0131na gelir<\/strong>. \u015eimdi, tabii ki de tatmin edici bir yan\u0131t de\u011fildir \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc sadece durum-nedenselli\u011fi problemini onun yerine e\u015fit derecede sorunlu eyleyici-nedenselli\u011fi kavram\u0131n\u0131 koyarak \u00e7\u00f6zmeye kalkar. Yine de, Wittgensteinc\u0131 yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n zihin-nedenselli\u011fine herhangi bir alan tan\u0131mad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 vurgulamak \u00f6nemlidir. Ama olumlu yan\u0131ndan bakacak olursak, yak\u0131n zamanda niyet sahibi eyleyicilerin nas\u0131l bir \u015feyleri ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirebildi\u011fine dair Wittgensteinci bir cevap imkan\u0131 \u00f6neren ilgin\u00e7 nedensellik g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fleri geli\u015fmektedir (\u00f6rne\u011fin, bkz. Mayr, 2011; Alvarez, 2013; Jacobs and O\u2019Connor, 2013).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:35px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size:30px\"><strong>5. Niyet N\u00f6robilimine Dair Olas\u0131 Sonu\u00e7lar<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:35px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00d6nceki b\u00f6l\u00fcmde ortaya konan felsefi yakla\u015f\u0131m, niyet \u00fczerine \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan bir\u00e7ok psikolog ve n\u00f6robilimciye olduk\u00e7a raddikal g\u00f6r\u00fcnse de bu yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131 tart\u0131\u015fmak i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli bir neden vard\u0131r ki o da yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n asl\u0131nda Uithol vd. (2014)\u2019\u00fcn ele ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 n\u00f6robilimsel bulgulara ilgin\u00e7 bir a\u00e7\u0131klama sunmas\u0131d\u0131r. <strong>Bu makalenin giri\u015f b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcnde de de\u011finildi\u011fi gibi, onlar\u0131n vard\u0131\u011f\u0131 sonu\u00e7 eylem kontrol\u00fcn\u00fcn alt\u0131nda yatan beyin s\u00fcre\u00e7lerinin niyet gibi bir durumun n\u00f6ral e\u015flenikleri olamayacak kadar dinamik oldu\u011fuydu<\/strong>. <strong>Onlar\u0131n \u00f6nerisi niyetin eylem kontrol\u00fcn\u00fcn bilimsel inceleni\u015fi i\u00e7in faydal\u0131 bir konsept olmayabilece\u011fi iken, burada benim \u00f6nerim hem niyet \u00fczerine olu\u015fmu\u015f felsefi literat\u00fcr\u00fcn hem de folk-psikolojik anlay\u0131\u015f\u0131n yeni bir niyet nosyonuna alan tan\u0131d\u0131\u011f\u0131yd\u0131<\/strong>. Niyet kavram\u0131n\u0131n herhangi ay\u0131rt edilebilir bir durum veya temel s\u00fcrece g\u00f6nderime bulunmayabilece\u011fini de\u011ferlendirmemiz gerekti\u011fini iddia ettim. E\u011fer bu mant\u0131kl\u0131 bir yakla\u015f\u0131msa, n\u00f6robilimin \u015fimdiye kadar niyeti ortaya \u00e7\u0131karan n\u00f6ral&nbsp;aktiviteye dair a\u00e7\u0131k se\u00e7ik bir resim sunamam\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131 art\u0131k s\u00fcrpriz de\u011fildir. <strong>Di\u011fer bir deyi\u015fle, b\u00f6ylesi durumlar\u0131n varl\u0131\u011f\u0131na dair n\u00f6robilimsel delil bulamam\u0131\u015f olabiliriz, \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc belki de b\u00f6yle durumlar zaten yoktur<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ancak, b\u00f6yle bir netice, ayn\u0131 zamanda niyet n\u00f6robilimi diye bir alan\u0131n olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 anlam\u0131na da gelmez mi? Dedi\u011fimiz gibi, <strong>Wittgensteinc\u0131 bir perspektiften, niyet kavram\u0131n\u0131 ba\u011fl\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 dair normatif beklentilerimizi ifade etmek i\u00e7in kullan\u0131yoruz ve bu ifadeler d\u00fcnyadaki belli ba\u015fl\u0131<\/strong> (de\u011fi\u015fken ve ak\u0131\u015fkan) <strong>\u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fclerin mevcudiyetine g\u00f6nderimde bulunuyor<\/strong>. O halde art\u0131k soru bu \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcleri bilimsel olarak inceleyip inceleyemeyece\u011fimizdir. <strong>Bu soruya en do\u011frudan yan\u0131t ise tam da bu \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fclerin de\u011fi\u015fkenli\u011fi ve ak\u0131\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 dolay\u0131s\u0131yla, bunlar\u0131n bilimsel analize m\u00fcsait olmad\u0131klar\u0131d\u0131r<\/strong>. <strong>Neticede, bu t\u00fcrden \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcler \u201cd\u00fczenlilikleri, ama kural olarak tasvir edilemeyecek kadar da da\u011f\u0131n\u0131k d\u00fczenlilikleri\u201d<\/strong> (Johnston, 2002) <strong>te\u015fkil ederler<\/strong>. <strong>Oysa bili\u015fsel bilimin amac\u0131 tam da alg\u0131, bili\u015f ve eylemin alt\u0131nda yatan <em>kurallar\u0131<\/em> belirlemek ve analiz etmektir<\/strong>. <strong>Daha da karma\u015f\u0131kla\u015facak ama, bu \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcler farkl\u0131 \u201ca\u00e7\u0131klama d\u00fczeylerine\u201d ait \u00f6\u011felerden m\u00fcte\u015fekkildirler<\/strong>. \u00d6rne\u011fin, <em>John\u2019un niyeti \u00e7imleri bi\u00e7mek<\/em> iddias\u0131n\u0131n g\u00f6nderimde bulundu\u011fu \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fc, \u201cSan\u0131r\u0131m bu ak\u015fam halledece\u011fim o i\u015fi!\u201d gibi s\u00f6z edimleri, kararl\u0131l\u0131kla ilgili baz\u0131 \u00f6znel hisler ve futbol ma\u00e7\u0131 i\u00e7in giderken arkada\u015flar\u0131n\u0131n onu bekleemeyece\u011fi gibi olgulardan olu\u015fuyor olabilir. Do\u011frusu, bu t\u00fcrden \u00f6\u011feleri b\u00fcnyesine katabilecek bir bilim dal\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmek olduk\u00e7a zor g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Yani, Wittgensteinc\u0131 niyet anlay\u0131\u015f\u0131 bir <em>niyet<\/em> (n\u00f6ro)bilimine pek de alan tan\u0131m\u0131yor<\/strong>. <strong>Ancak, bana kal\u0131rsa Wittgensteinc\u0131 perspektif bilimsel inceleme i\u00e7in \u00fc\u00e7 m\u00fcmk\u00fcn yol a\u00e7\u0131yor bizlere<\/strong>. <strong>Birincisi, niyet s\u00f6yleminin i\u00e7erdi\u011fi baz\u0131 \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcler ayn\u0131 zamanda fiziksel fenomenleri de i\u00e7eriyor gibi g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyor<\/strong>. Mesela burada akl\u0131m\u0131za dikkat ve uyar\u0131lma gelebilir. Ve n\u00f6robilimin bu fenomenlerin alt\u0131nda yatan s\u00fcre\u00e7 ve mekanizmalar\u0131 \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan temel bilimlerden biri oldu\u011fu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fcnde, dikkat ve uyar\u0131lma a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan, bir niyeti olu\u015fturman\u0131n, s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmenin ve&nbsp;hayata ge\u00e7irmenin ne anlama geldi\u011fine dair yeni i\u00e7g\u00f6r\u00fcler sa\u011flamas\u0131 beklenebilir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u0130kinci olarak, halihaz\u0131rda bahsedildi\u011fi \u00fczere, durumsal bili\u015f yakla\u015f\u0131mlar\u0131nda bir y\u00fckseli\u015f bulunuyor ve bu kendisini hem teorik hem de empirik \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalarda g\u00f6steriyor<\/strong> (Clark ve Chalmers, 1998; Bechtel, 2009; Hutto, 2013; Varela et al., 2017). <strong>Bu yakla\u015f\u0131mlar genel olarak bili\u015fi bedensel, g\u00f6m\u00fcl\u00fc, geni\u015fletilmi\u015f ve\/ya enaktif olarak g\u00f6rd\u00fcklerinden, bili\u015fsel ve n\u00f6robilimsel analizin kapsam\u0131n\u0131 beyin ve hatta bedenden \u00f6teye ta\u015f\u0131mak gibi i\u00e7kin bir itkileri var<\/strong> (Silberstein ve Chemero, 2012; Van Orden ve Stephen, 2012; Favela ve Martin, 2017). <strong>Bu h\u0131zla geli\u015fen saha, niyet s\u00f6yleminin kapsad\u0131\u011f\u0131 karma\u015f\u0131k \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcler t\u00fcr\u00fcnden bir bili\u015fsel ve n\u00f6robilimsel analizin gelecek hangi \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olup olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131nda belirleyici olacak olduk\u00e7a de\u011ferli metodolojik ara\u00e7lar sa\u011flayabili<\/strong>r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Son olarak, a\u011f kuram\u0131<\/strong> (network theory) <strong>psikometrik disiplini i\u00e7inde \u00f6nemli bir metodolojik yakla\u015f\u0131m haline gelmi\u015f bulunuyor<\/strong> (Borsboom ve Cramer, 2013; Schmittmann et al., 2013; Dalege et al., 2016). Bu yakla\u015f\u0131m psikolojik yap\u0131lar\u0131 (construct) nedensel olarak birbirleriyle ba\u011fl\u0131 nodlardan olu\u015fan a\u011flar olarak modelliyor ve bu a\u00e7\u0131dan niyetleri i\u00e7eren \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcleri bilimsel olarak incelemekle de alakal\u0131 olabilir. <strong>\u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc a\u011f yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131 <em>psikometrik<\/em> bir yakla\u015f\u0131m olarak geli\u015ftirildi\u011finden, nodlar kullan\u0131larak olu\u015fturulacak a\u011flar ve bunlar\u0131n modelleri fenomenler konusunda olduk\u00e7a a\u00e7\u0131k u\u00e7lu olmakla birlikte, hangi fenomenin hangi seviyede tasvir edilip a\u00e7\u0131klanaca\u011f\u0131na dair de herhangi bir k\u0131s\u0131tl\u0131l\u0131k getirmiyor<\/strong>. <strong>Bu da demek oluyor ki, bir niyeti atfederken \u2018tan\u0131d\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131z\u2019 \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcye ait fenomenleri tespit etmek m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olduk\u00e7a, ve bu fenomenler nicel olarak \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fclebildik\u00e7e, b\u00f6yle bir \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcn\u00fcn a\u011f modelini olu\u015fturmak ve buna g\u00f6re analiz etmek de m\u00fcmk\u00fcnd\u00fcr<\/strong>. A\u011f biliminin \u015fu anki durumu b\u00f6yle bir modele izin vermese de, gelece\u011fin niyet incelemeleri i\u00e7in bu potansiyeli ara\u015ft\u0131rmak faydal\u0131d\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:30px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size:35px\"><strong>Dipnotlar<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:30px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a id=\"_ftn1\" href=\"#_ftnref1\">[<strong>1<\/strong>]<\/a> Folk-psikoloji, psikolojik fenomenlere dair g\u00fcndelik hayattaki kavray\u0131\u015f\u0131m\u0131z ve kavram setimizi ifade eder. Hemen her bilim dal\u0131 i\u00e7in o bilim dal\u0131nda uzmanla\u015fmam\u0131\u015f ya da herhangi bir e\u011fitim almam\u0131\u015f ki\u015filerin dahi sezgisel bir kavray\u0131\u015flar\u0131 vard\u0131r. \u00d6rne\u011fin, fizi\u011fe dair hi\u00e7bir kurumsal e\u011fitim almam\u0131\u015f ki\u015fi veya bu se\u00e7ene\u011fin bulunmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 yerel k\u00fclt\u00fcrlerde bile, insanlar a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131klar\u0131na g\u00f6re cisimlerin nas\u0131l davranacaklar\u0131na, \u00e7e\u015fitli durumlarda dengede durup durmayacaklar\u0131na vs. dair sezgilere sahiptir. Buna folk-fizik denir. Folk-psikoloji, bu durumun psikolojiyle ilgili fenomenler i\u00e7in ge\u00e7erli versiyonudur. (E.N.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref2\" data-type=\"internal\" data-id=\"#_ftnref2\">[2]<\/a> Bili\u015fsel bilimde \u201cy\u00fcksek seviye\u201d ile kast edilen duyusal, alg\u0131sal ve motor s\u00fcre\u00e7lerden daha soyut, ak\u0131l y\u00fcr\u00fctme, plan yapma, dil, bellek, dikkat, mant\u0131k vs. gibi s\u00fcre\u00e7lerdir. Burada \u201ca\u015fa\u011f\u0131\u201d ve \u201cy\u00fcksek\u201d kavramlar\u0131, \u00f6rne\u011fin, duyusal, alg\u0131sal ve motor s\u00fcre\u00e7ler \u00e7ok geni\u015f bir canl\u0131l\u0131k yelpazesinde g\u00f6r\u00fclse de daha soyut becerilerin canl\u0131lar\u0131n \u00e7o\u011funda g\u00f6zlenmedi\u011fi fikrinden, yani bu soyut s\u00fcre\u00e7lerin, \u201ca\u015fa\u011f\u0131\u201d seviye s\u00fcre\u00e7lerin \u00fczerine bina oldu\u011fu fikrinden do\u011far.(E.N.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref3\">[3]<\/a> Modal ve amodal ayr\u0131m\u0131, bili\u015fsel bilimde temsillerin do\u011fas\u0131yla ilgili bir tart\u0131\u015fmad\u0131r. Bili\u015fsel bilim ilk ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131\u011f\u0131 d\u00f6nemlerde, zihinsel temsillerin bilgisayardaki veya dildeki temsiller gibi, temsil ettikleri \u015fey veya olaylara dair \u201cmodaliteye \u00f6zg\u00fc\u201d, yani ses, koku, renk, \u015fekil, doku vs. itibariyle enformasyon i\u00e7ermedi\u011fi d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcl\u00fcyordu. T\u0131pk\u0131 \u201cat\u201d kelimesinin fiziksel bir atla hi\u00e7bir benzerli\u011fi olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi, ya da birtak\u0131m 01 dizilerinin ekran g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcm\u00fcz \u015fekille kendinde bir benzerli\u011fi olmamas\u0131 gibi, zihindeki temsillerin de b\u00f6yle soyut oldu\u011fu \u00f6ne s\u00fcr\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Fakat daha sonra bu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fe kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kanlar, zihinsel temsillerin modal enformasyon i\u00e7erdi\u011fini s\u00f6yleyenler ve buna dair pek \u00e7ok \u00e7al\u0131\u015fma ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftiren ara\u015ft\u0131rmac\u0131lar da olmu\u015ftur. (E.N.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref4\" data-type=\"internal\" data-id=\"#_ftnref4\">[4]<\/a> \u201cZihinsel i\u00e7erik\u201d (mental content) zihinsel temsillerin sahip oldu\u011fu \u201canlam\u201dd\u0131r. \u00d6rne\u011fin, dil \u00fczerinden d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnecek olursak \u201ckalem\u201d temsili, yani bu spesifik ses veya harf (yaz\u0131 format\u0131) dizisinin bir arada bulunu\u015fu, ger\u00e7ek bir kalem i\u00e7eri\u011fine, yani anlam\u0131na sahiptir. Fakat bu anlam spesifik renk, boyut vs. gibi fiziksel \u00f6zelliklere sahip olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan genel olarak t\u00fcm \u201ckalemleri\u201d i\u015faret etti\u011finden, zihindeki temsillerin de benzer \u015fekilde amodal oldu\u011fu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. Fakat sonraki ara\u015ft\u0131rmac\u0131lar bu \u201cgenelli\u011fin\u201d modal \u015fekillerde de kurulabilece\u011fini teorik ve empirik olarak g\u00f6stermi\u015flerdir. (E.N.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref5\" data-type=\"internal\" data-id=\"#_ftnref5\">[<\/a><a href=\"#_ftnref5\">5]<\/a> Asl\u0131nda bu T\u00fcrk\u00e7ede tam olarak b\u00f6yle \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131yor gibi g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyor. Fakat metnin ba\u011flam\u0131 i\u00e7in yeterince anla\u015f\u0131l\u0131r oldu\u011fundan \u00e7eviriye sad\u0131k kal\u0131yoruz. (E.N.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref6\">[6]<\/a> Burada analitik felsefede \u00f6zellikle metafizi\u011fin, dil felsefesinin ve zihin felsefesinin kesi\u015fimdeki ilgin\u00e7 bir tansiyona referans veriliyor. Burada \u201crasyonel\u201d, en temelde \u201cgerek\u00e7eli\u201d a\u00e7\u0131klama anlam\u0131nda kullan\u0131l\u0131yor. Fakat \u201crasyonel\u201d (gerek\u00e7eli) ile \u201cnedensel\u201d a\u00e7\u0131klaman\u0131n fark\u0131 nedir? En temelde d\u00fcnyada gerek\u00e7e verebilen \u015feyler ve gerek\u00e7e veremeyen \u015feyler vard\u0131r. \u00d6rne\u011fin, biz fizikteki veya jeolojideki falanca do\u011fa olay\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamak istiyorsak, burada do\u011faya akli bir soru y\u00f6neltip ondan akli bir yan\u0131t almam\u0131z m\u00fcmk\u00fcn de\u011fildir. Burada olas\u0131 tek a\u00e7\u0131klama d\u00fczlemi \u201cnedensel\u201d a\u00e7\u0131klamad\u0131r. Fakat insan i\u00e7in, yani rasyonel, ak\u0131l y\u00fcr\u00fctebilen \u00f6zneler i\u00e7in ikinci bir d\u00fczlem ortaya \u00e7\u0131kar. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc insanlar, altta yatan fiziksel nedensel s\u00fcre\u00e7ler birbirlerinden \u00e7ok\u00e7a farkl\u0131 olsa da \u201cayn\u0131\u201d gerek\u00e7e ile ayn\u0131 eylemde bulunabilecekleri gibi, ayn\u0131 fiziksel nedensel&nbsp; s\u00fcre\u00e7ler ile farkl\u0131 gerek\u00e7elere ve eylemlere de sahip olabilirler (asl\u0131nda bu da tart\u0131\u015fmal\u0131, fakat en az\u0131ndan bu \u2018anla\u015f\u0131lamaz\u2019 kendi i\u00e7inde \u00e7eli\u015fik bir ifade olmamas\u0131 itibariyle sa\u00e7ma bir \u00f6nerme de\u011fil). Bu iki d\u00fczlemin birbiriyle ili\u015fkisi nedir? Davran\u0131\u015f\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamakta aslolan d\u00fczlem hangisidir? Davidson, \u201cgerek\u00e7e\u201d d\u00fczleminin yetersiz oldu\u011funu, \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc tek bir eylemin farkl\u0131 ge\u00e7erli gerek\u00e7eleri olabilece\u011fini, dolay\u0131s\u0131yla bunlar aras\u0131ndan a\u00e7\u0131klay\u0131c\u0131 olan\u0131n ancak \u201cger\u00e7ekten nedensel olarak belirleyici\u201d olan gerek\u00e7e oldu\u011funu s\u00f6yl\u00fcyor. Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla gerek\u00e7eli a\u00e7\u0131klama, nedensel a\u00e7\u0131klamadan ayr\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fclemez diyor. (E.N.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref7\">[7]<\/a> Metindeki commitment\u2019\u0131 ba\u011fl\u0131l\u0131k olarak \u00e7evirdim, yani vermek istedi\u011fim anlam eyleme y\u00f6nelik bir kendini adam\u0131\u015fl\u0131k. Bu bazen, eyleme y\u00f6nelik bir kararl\u0131l\u0131k olarak da anla\u015f\u0131labilir fakat metnin anlam b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc korumak i\u00e7in kararl\u0131l\u0131k kelimesini koymaktan \u00e7ekindim. T\u00fcrk\u00e7ede fazla anlam kaymas\u0131 olmuyor gibi g\u00f6r\u00fcnse de \u0130ngilizcede olabiliyor. (\u00c7.N.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref8\">[8]<\/a> \u00c7oklu ger\u00e7ekle\u015febilirlik g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fc, fiziksel temelleri bamba\u015fka iki sistem i\u00e7in (\u00f6rne\u011fin insan beyni ve bilgisayar) e\u011fer girdi ve \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131 \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcleri \u201cdo\u011fru t\u00fcrden\u201d sistematik \u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcleri yerine getiriyorsa, o halde her ikisinde de ayn\u0131 zihinsel durumdan bahsetmenin ola\u011fan oldu\u011funu s\u00f6yler. (E.N.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref9\">[9]<\/a> <em>Volition<\/em> ve <em>will <\/em>kelimelerinin T\u00fcrk\u00e7e \u00e7evirisi biraz \u00e7etrefillidir. \u0130kisi de kimilerince ve ba\u011flam\u0131na g\u00f6re hem irade hem istek hem de isten\u00e7 olarak \u00e7evrilegelmi\u015flerdir. Burada makalenin yazar\u0131 \u201cwill\u201d kelimesini kullan\u0131rken Ryle esasen <em>volition<\/em> kelimesini kullanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Biz metinde daha \u00f6nce \u201cvolition\u201d i\u00e7in irade dedi\u011fimizden, burada <em>will<\/em> i\u00e7in isten\u00e7 kelimesini kullan\u0131yoruz. (E.N.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref10\">[10]<\/a> Bu \u00f6rnek de T\u00fcrk\u00e7e a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan ilgin\u00e7 bir vaka sunuyor ve felsefi meselelerin do\u011fal dille i\u00e7 i\u00e7eli\u011fini karma\u015f\u0131kla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131yor. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc T\u00fcrk\u00e7ede biz pekala s\u0131kl\u0131kla \u201cak\u015fama kadar partiye gitme niyetim vard\u0131, ama sonra vazge\u00e7tim\u201d gibi \u015feyle s\u00f6yl\u00fcyoruz. (E.N.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ftnref11\" data-type=\"internal\" data-id=\"#_ftnref11\">[11]<\/a> Bu iki \u00f6rnek de \u0130ngilizcede <em>to have<\/em> (sahip olmak) fiiliyle ifade edilir (<em>to have a car <\/em>ve <em>to have a quick temper<\/em>). Yazar burada bir \u015feye sahip olmak onun illa s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131 ve yeri yurdu belli bir nesne olaca\u011f\u0131 anlam\u0131na gelmedi\u011fini vurguluyor. (E.N.).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:35px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size:30px\"><strong>Kaynak\u00e7a <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:35px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Aguilar, J. H., and Buckareff, A. A. (2010). Causing human actions: New perspectives on the causal theory of action. 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